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THE EMPLOYMENT HANDBOOK AS A CONTRACTUAL
LIMITATION ON THE EMPLOYMENT
AT WILL DOCTRINE
I. INTRODUCTION
The employment at will doctrine, developed in the late nineteenth
century, holds that under a general agreement of employment for an
indefinite length of time, the hiring of an employee is at will and the
employer is free to terminate an employee at any time for any reason.'
While it is still followed by many jurisdictions today,2 the employment at
will doctrine has been subject to several restrictions because of its harsh
effect upon the employee.3 These restrictions have come about through
1. See Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507 (1884). The court in
Payne stated, "All may dismiss their employees at will, be they many or few, for
good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong." Id. at 519-2 1. For a
discussion of the history of the employment at will doctrine, see infra notes 10-
15 and accompanying text.
A distinction is made by courts between contracts of employment for a defi-
nite duration and contracts of employment for an indefinite duration. At com-
mon law, when a contract fixed a definite period of employment, just cause had
to be shown by an employer in order to terminate an employee prior to the
conclusion of the employment term. 53 AM. JUR. 2D Master and Servant § § 34, 43
(1970). Under the common law doctrine of employment at will, however, the
employer was not always required to provide a justification for the termination
of the employee because the employment relationship was terminable at will.
Comment, Employment At Will and the Law of Contracts, 33 BUFFALO L. REV. 211,
215 (1974). This note is primarily concerned with the indefinite term of employ-
ment and the effect of the employment at will doctrine on this relationship.
2. See, e.g., Broussard v. CACI, Inc., 780 F.2d 162 (1st Cir. 1986) (contract
of employment for indefinite length of time is terminable at will by either party
unless intention is stated clearly in express terms that discharge must be for
good cause); Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359
(D.S.C. 1985) (court applied employment at will doctrine in its refusal to adopt
either implied covenant of good faith or contractual obligations based on em-
ployment handbook).
3. The harshness of the employment at will doctrine can be seen in a
number of ways. First, the employment at will rule fails to take into account the
lack of equal bargaining strength between employer and employee. Comment,
Employment at Will: When Must an Employer Have Good Cause for Discharging an Em-
ployee?, 48 Mo. L. REV. 113, 116 (1983). Second, the employee's interest in job
security is subordinated to the employer's interest in running his business af-
fairs. Id. Third, the rule allows employers to fire employees for reasons that
offend public policy. Id. See also Note, Employment At Will: An Analysis and Critique
of the Judicial Role, 68 IOWA L. REV. 787, 793 (1983) (since employer's right to
discharge is unrestricted under employment at will doctrine, employers have
fired employees to avoid paying workman's compensation and earned pension
benefits).
The harshness of the employment at will doctrine is significant because of
the great percentage of American workers it effects. Note, Protecting At Will Em-
ployees Against Wrongful Discharge. The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93
(335)
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various means such as collective bargaining,4 statutory limitations,5 tort
theories, 6 and contract theories.
7
Several recent cases have reflected this trend toward limiting the
employment at will doctrine and have held that where an employer sup-
plies an employee at will with a company handbook that sets forth poli-
cies regarding termination of employees, these policies become terms of
the employment contract.8 Courts are split, however, on whether the
policies found in an employment handbook constitute terms of the em-
ployment contract. 9 This note will provide an overview of the employ-
HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Wrongful Discharge]. Union
employees are protected by collective bargaining agreements that set forth the
conditions upon which an employee may be terminated. Id. at 1816. Also, fed-
eral government workers are protected by statutory law requiring proof of "just
cause" in order to terminate. Id. at 1816 n.1 (citing Civil Service Reform Act of
1978 § 204(a), 5 U.S.C. § 7503 (Supp. 11 1978)). However, approximately 60 to
65% of the entire American work force falls outside either of the above catego-
ries and is subject to a presumption of employment at will. Id. at 1816 n.2. See
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 406 (1984) (table 670: total workforce); id. at 439 (table 726:
union membership); id. at 303 (table 487: government employees).
It should be noted, however, that employees have set forth an argument
that legitimate interests are served by the employment at will doctrine in a mod-
ern society. W. OUTrEN & N. KINIGSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES 30 (1983).
Employers argue that the foundation of America's economic success rests upon
their ability to hire and retain the best personnel they can find. Id. From that
premise it follows that the less management decisions regarding employment
are restricted, the more management is able to run an efficient and profitable
business. Id. Employers point to the inefficiencies of government bureaucracies
as proof that limiting the employer's right to discharge workers negatively af-
fects the American business community. Id.
4. For a discussion of the use of collective bargaining as a restriction on the
employment at will doctrine, see infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of the use of statutory remedies as a restriction on the
employment at will doctrine, see infra notes 25-37 and accompanying text.
6. For a discussion of the use of tort theory as a restriction on the employ-
ment at will doctrine, see infra notes 38-52 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of the use of contract theory as a restriction on the em-
ployment at will doctrine, see infra notes 53-86 and accompanying text.
8. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d
880 (1980); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983);
Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 101
N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985).
9. Several cases have held that the terms of an employment manual may
create contractually enforceable provisions regarding job security. See, e.g.,
Wolk v. Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., 728 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1984); Thompson v. Ameri-
can Motor Inns, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. Va. 1985); Brooks v. Trans World
Airlines, 574 F. Supp. 805 (D. Colo. 1983); Wagner v. Sperry Univac, 458 F.
Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 624 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir. 1980); Leikvold v. Valley
View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 170 (1984) (en banc); Walker
v. Northern San Diego County Hosp. Dist., 135 Cal. App. 3d 896, 185 Cal. Rptr.
617 (1982); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d
880 (1980); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983);
Arie v. Intertherm, 648 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Southwest Gas Corp.
v. Ahmad, 99 Nev. 594, 668 P.2d 261 (1983); Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche,
336 [Vol. 31: p. 335
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ment at will doctrine and its various limitations. Further, this note will
examine the development of the employment handbook as a limitation
on the employment at will doctrine. Finally, this note will detail recent
decisions in this area, and conclude that under a strict unilateral contract
analysis, the employment handbook provides a basis for establishing
terms of an employment contract regarding job security, and in the pro-
cess, provides more certainty in the employment relationship.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Employment At Will Doctrine and Its Subsequent Restriction Through
Modern Legal Developments
The employment at will doctrine had its origin in America in 1872,
when Horace Wood articulated the doctrine in his treatise on master-
servant relationships, stating:
With us the rule is inflexible that a general or indefinite hiring
is primafacie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it
out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by
proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month, or year, no time
being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption at-
taches that it was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for
Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985);
Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193
(1982); Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976); Simpson v.
Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96, 643 P.2d 1276 (1982); Yartzoff v. Demo-
crat-Herald Publishing Co., 281 Or. 651, 576 P.2d 356 (1978); Osterkamp v.
Alkota Mfg., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 275 (S.D. 1983); Hamby v. Genesco, Inc., 627
S.W.2d 373 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.
2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984) (en banc).
To the contrary, several cases have held that the terms of an employment
manual do not create contractually enforceable provisions regarding job secur-
ity. See, e.g., Caster v. Hennessey, 727 F.2d 1075 (11 th Cir. 1984); Satterfield v.
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359 (D.S.C. 1985); Rogers v.
IBM, 500 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Beidler v. W.R. Grace, Inc., 461 F.
Supp. 1013 (E.D. Pa. 1978), afd, 609 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1979); Schroeder v.
Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp. 910, amended, 456 F. Supp. 650 (E.D. Mich.
1978); White v. Chelsea Indus., 425 So. 2d 1090 (Ala. 1983); Heideck v. Kent
Gen. Hosp., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982); McQueeney v. Glenn, 400 N.E.2d 806
(Ind. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1125 (1981); Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind.
App. 1, 328 N.E.2d 775 (1975); Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan.
52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976); Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 263 Minn. 520, 117
N.W.2d 213 (1962); Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont.
1982); Mau v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 299 N.W.2d 147 (1980); Wil-
liams v. Biscuitville, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 405, 253 S.E.2d 18, cert. denied, 297 N.C.
457, 256 S.E.2d 810 (1979); Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., No. 01064 (Pa.
Super. June 12, 1986); Richardson v. Charles Cole Memorial Hosp., 320 Pa.
Super. 106, 466 A.2d 1084 (1983).
For a discussion of the status of employment handbooks nationally, see
Decker, Reinstatement as a Remedy for a Pennsylvania Employer's Breach of a Handbook
or an Employment Policy, 90 DicK. L. REV. 41, 47-52 (1985).
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whatever time the party may serve,' 0
Wood's formulation created a rebuttable presumption that an in-
definite hiring is a hiring at will." Though subject to some criticism, 12
the employment at will doctrine pronounced by Wood was followed by
many jurisdictions, with the leading case being Martin v. New York Life
Insurance Co. 13 In the cases following Martin, the doctrine evolved into
10. H. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1887) (emphasis added).
Prior to Wood's statement, American courts had not yet recognized the employ-
ment at will doctrine. Accordingly, various jurisdictions adopted a number of
approaches to the employment relationship, including the English common law
presumption of employment for a period of one year. See, e.g., Davis v. Gorton,
16 N.Y. 255, 257 (1857) ("to give each party the benefit of all the seasons during
the year, an indefinite hiring is taken to be a hiring for a year"). See also Isbell-
Sirotkin, Defending the Abusively Discharged Employee: In Search of a Judicial Solution,
12 N.M.L. REV. 711, 713 (1982) (most jurisdictions in early nineteenth century
adopted British common law rule of presumption of employment for one year).
A number of courts at one time followed the rule that a hiring would be
presumed to continue for a period of time equivalent to the employee's pay pe-
riod. See, e.g., Morris Shoe Co. v. Coleman, 187 Ky. 837, 221 S.W. 242 (1920)
(plaintiff's agreement to work for defendant for $1,800 per year, payable
monthly, held to be contract of employment for one year); Kelley v. Carthage
Wheel Co., 62 Ohio St. 597, 57 N.E. 984 (1900) (factory worker's agreement
with employer to work for one year at salary of $3,000 held to be binding con-
tract not terminable at will); Pinckney v. Talmage, 32 S.C. 364, 10 S.E. 1083
(1890) (contract indicating plaintiffs salary would be paid monthly at rate of
$5.00 per year held employment by month). See also Note, Employment Contract-
Indefinite Length-Hiring Terminable By Employer For Cause Only Without Mutuality of
Obligations-For Cause Requirement Implied Where Reasonable Expectations Created By
Employee Policy Manual, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 373, 375 (1981) (majority American
rule in nineteenth century at one time involved presumption that hiring contin-
ued for period of time identical to period fixed for employment).
Other jurisdictions refused to apply any presumptions regarding the length
of employment. Id. In these jurisdictions, the question of duration of employ-
ment presented a question of fact for the jury. See, e.g., Graves v. Lyon Bros. &
Co., 110 Mich. 620, 68 N.W. 985 (1896) (upholding finding by jury, based on all
facts presented, that plaintiff entered contract of employment for one year);
Chamberlain v. Detroit Stove Works, 103 Mich. 124, 61 N.W. 532 (1894) (jury
properly found plaintiff entitled to payment for period of one year).
11. Peirce, Mann & Roberts, Employee Termination At Will: A Principled Ap-
proach, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Peirce]. Without a
clearly expressed intent of the parties to bind an employee, an employee was
free to sell his services to another while the employer was entitled to terminate
the employment relationship at any time. Id.
12. Several commentators have indicated that Wood offered little or no
analysis to justify the adoption of the employment at will rule. Note, Implied
Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 341 (1974). Wood cited only
four American cases as authority for his proposition, none of which offered
much support. Id. (citing Wilder v. United States, 5 Ct. Cl. 462 (1869), rev'd on
other grounds, 80 U.S. 254 (1871); De Briar v. Minturn, 1 Cal. 450 (1851); Tatter-
son v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56 (1870); Franklin Mining Co. v. Harris, 24
Mich. 115 (1871)).
13. 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895). In Martin, the plaintiff agreed to a
yearly salary of $10,000 beginning in January 1892, but was terminated four
months later in April 1892. Id. at 119, 42 N.E. at 416-17. Plaintiff brought suit
[Vol. 31: p. 335
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an absolute presumption in many jurisdictions, despite the fact that the
doctrine as stated by Wood created only a rebuttable presumption of a
hiring at will.' 4 The courts eagerly adopted the employment at will
doctrine, largely because of the influence of laissez-faire economics and
governmental policies favoring self-reliance and economic
individualism. 15
to recover the remainder of his annual salary owing from May 1892 until January
of the following year. Id. at 118, 42 N.E. at 416. The Martin court cited Wood's
statement of the rule, and held that the plaintiff could be discharged at the will
of the employer. Id. at 121, 42 N.E. at 417.
14. Note, supra note 10, at 377 ("Courts finding a contract did not express
duration typically held that the hiring was at will, without considering whether
the facts and circumstances of the hiring might rebut the presumption.") (foot-
note omitted).
15. Note, Wrongful Discharge, supra note 3, at 1826. Prior to the employment
at will doctrine, American courts relied heavily on English common law. Isbell-
Sirotkin, supra note 10, at 713. English common law developed during the four-
teenth through nineteenth centuries, when the master-servant relationship
predominated. Id. This setting engendered a sense of commitment and respon-
sibility on the part of both the employer and the employee. Id. As a result, the
presumption of employment for a year's duration existed prior to the formula-
tion of the employment at will doctrine. Id. However, the industrial growth in
the United States in the nineteenth century transformed the master-servant rela-
tionship, as one commentator explains:
The status of the workers changed from that of quasi-family member to
a much more distant and purely economic relationship. Similarly, the
duration of employment became dependent upon the demand for the
product. Accordingly, it made little sense for public policy to impose
an obligation on the employer to continue employment through all
four seasons.
H. PERRITr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.3, at 3-4 (1984 &
Supp. 1985) (footnotes omitted).
Industrial growth in America, therefore, brought a shift in political and so-
cial attitudes toward laissez-faire principles calling for "freedom of bargaining as
a fundamental and indispensible requisite of progress." Peirce, supra note 11, at
4 (citing Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 366 (1921)). Apply-
ing the laissez-faire theory to employment contracts resulted in the rejection of
the presumption that indefinite hirings lasted for a specific duration. Note,
Wrongful Discharge, supra note 3, at 1826. The rationale was that if the parties had
intended the employment to last for a specific duration they would have made
that an express term of the contract. Id. at 1825. See also Murg & Scharman,
Employment at Will. Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. REV. 329, 334
(1982); Note, supra note 12, at 340-41.
Two Supreme Court cases reflect the influence of laissez-faire economics.
In Adair v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a
federal statute that barred common carriers from dismissing employees for
union membership. 208 U.S. 161 (1908). In finding the statute unconstitu-
tional, the Supreme Court stated that regulation of the employment relationship
violated the parties' freedom to contract. Id. at 175. The Court also pointed out
that because the employee's right to quit was equivalent to the employer's right
to fire an employee, compelling one person to retain the personal services of
another is an invasion of personal liberty and the right of property guaranteed
by the fifth amendment. Id. at 174-76. Seven years later, in Coppage v. Kansas,
the Supreme Court invalidated legislation similar to Adair under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 236 U.S. 1 (1915). In Coppage, the Court
5
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Despite its general acceptance in the late nineteenth century, the
number of courts willing to strictly apply the employment at will doc-
trine has greatly declined in recent years. ' 6 Indeed, one writer has con-
cluded that more than two-thirds of American jurisdictions have now
abandoned a strict formulation of the rule. 17 Moreover, it is significant
that, of the jurisdictions still strictly following the employment at will
doctrine, many either have not considered the issue recently or have
shown a willingness to recognize exceptions to the rule should the ap-
propriate case arise.' 8 This trend in limiting the employment at will
recognized the possibility of a disparity in bargaining power between the em-
ployer and employee under the employment at will doctrine, but insisted on its
use because of the important function it serves in promoting laissez-faire eco-
nomics and freedom of contract. Id. at 38.
16. H. PERRIr, supra note 15, § 1.11, at 18-19.
17. Id. at 18. Perritt indicates that, as of 1985, some means of recovery in
tort for wrongful discharge has been recognized in 41 states: Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. (footnotes
omitted).
18. Id. at 20-21 (footnotes omitted). There are many different explanations
why the employment at will doctrine has become so restricted. The reasons for
the erosion are rooted in technological, economic, and sociological changes in
the employment relationship. See Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Free-
dom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404,
1405 (1967) (employee lack of mobility has increased concern overjob security);
Heshizer, The New Common Law of Employment: Changes in the Concept of Employment
at Will, 36 LAB. L.J. 95, 97-98 (1985) (heightened dependency on job security in
modern society has led to decline of employment at will doctrine); Marrinan,
Employment at- Will: Pandora's Box May Have an Attractive Cover, 7 Hamline L. Rev.
155, 158 (1983) ("The at-will rule therefore may have made social and economic
sense when it was first enunciated; nevertheless, the rationale for its existence is
lacking today.").
Technological changes affecting bargaining power in the employer-em-
ployee relationship include the shift from self-employment to concentrated in-
dustrial job markets and the increasing demand for specialization. Note, supra
note 12, at 337-38. The lack of opportunity for self-employment in today's in-
dustrial system is evidenced by the fact that 90% of the present labor force can
be classified as wage or salary earners. Id. (citing REPORT OF SPECIAL TAsK
FORCE TO SECRETARY OF HEW, WORK IN AMERICA 20-23 (1972)). Thus, as the
workforce becomes concentrated under the employment of fewer corporate em-
ployers, the bargaining power of nonunion employees diminishes, while em-
ployer bargaining power rapidly expands. Id.
Economically, the employee often finds himself bound to his job because of
work benefits such as pension, severence, and seniority rights. Note, supra note
3, at 792. Also, from an economic point of view, the mere cost of finding a new
job will prevent many employees from attempting to do so. Id.
Sociological changes affecting bargaining power includes the fear of being
unemployed that results from the possibility of losing one's earnings while
searching for a new job. Blades, supra, at 1413.
Thus, it appears that only the unusually valuable employee has sufficient
[Vol. 31: p. 335
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doctrine is the product of modern legal developments in four major
areas.
1. Collective Bargaining as a Restriction on Employment at Will
One primary limitation on the employment at will doctrine is the
use of collective bargaining. As a great number of industrial workers
grew insecure over their lack of bargaining power in the face of an in-
dustrial revolution, union activities greatly increased. 19 In 1935, the
passage of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) gave express rec-
ognition to the power of organized labor. 20 While the NLRA did not
directly abrogate the employment at will doctrine, it firmly established
the employee's right to collective bargaining. 2 1 In utilization of this
right, a large majority of the employment agreements made through col-
lective bargaining have included a requirement of just cause in order to
terminate an employee. 22
A just cause provision protects union members from the harshness
of the employment at will doctrine by contractually binding the em-
ployer to his agreement with the union to terminate only for just
cause.2 3 However, the effect of collective bargaining on the ability to
bargaining power to justify imposition of the employment at will doctrine. Id.
As Blades stated, "While a few employees might possess talents so unusual and
important that the employer would not risk losing them, most employees are not
irreplaceable. The great majority of employees realize that they are expendable,
and this realization renders them easy prey to the employer's overreaching de-
mands." Id.
19. Note,Job Security For the at Will Employee: Contractual Right of Discharge For
Cause, 57 CHI. [-] KENT L. REV. 697, 706-07 (1981).
20. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1982)). See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). In Jones & Laughlin, the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the NLRA. Id. at 30. In deciding the case, the Court
evinced a deep concern with the employee's lack of equal bargaining power
when contracting the terms of employment with his or her employer. Id. at 33.
21. Section 8(1) of the NLRA (later amended to be § 8(a)(1)) declared it
illegal for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees" in their
exercise of the right to organize and bargain collectively to engage in peaceful
activities. R. GORMAN, BASic TEXT ON LABOR LAw 132 (1976). In addition,
§ 8(3) of the NLRA (later amended to be § 8(a)(3)) made illegal any employer
discrimination in hiring, firing, or working conditions to encourage or discour-
age union membership. Id.
22. It has been estimated that as many as 82% of all collective bargaining
agreements contain some general restriction, such as just cause, on an em-
ployer's power to dismiss. Note, Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged
Employee, 26 HASTINGS LJ. 1435, 1448 (1975).
23. Note, supra note 22, at 1448. In addition, many collective bargaining
agreements contain provisions requiring the use of binding arbitration to solve
grievance disputes. Id. The significance or importance of arbitration is that
even if a collective bargaining agreement fails to include requirements of just
cause, many arbitrators will imply it. H. PERRIrT, supra note 15, § 3.5, at 87. See
also Atwater Mfg. Co., 13 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 747, 749-50 (1949) (if specific lan-
guage of collective bargaining agreement does not confer on management right
7
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limit the employment at will doctrine, while significant, does not provide
a comprehensive solution to the harshness of the employment at will
doctrine due to the limited number of unionized workers in the United
States.2 4
2. Statutory Restrictions on the Employment at Will Doctrine
A second limitation on the employment at will doctrine arises
through state and federal statutory protections of employees' rights.
Legislative activity limiting the employer's right to discharge was first
evidenced by the Railway Labor Act of 1926 (RLA), 25 which gave both
railroad employers and employees the right to bargain without interfer-
ence by one side against the other.26 Similarly, as discussed above, the
subsequent enactment of the NLRA in 1935 gave protection to employ-
ees by prohibiting dismissal for union activities. 2 7 In addition, since the
enactment of the NLRA, other laws have been enacted, significantly lim-
iting an employer's power to discharge. 2 8
The protection afforded by the RLA, NLRA, and related statutes,
however, like the protection afforded by collective bargaining, has been
far from comprehensive. Legislative activity, for the most part, has re-
sulted in the protection of only certain classes of people. 29 For exam-
to discharge at will, and explicit terms of agreement are inconsistent with at will
doctrine, just cause will be required for valid discharge).
24. Blades, supra note 18, at 1410-11. Less than 25% of the American
working population is covered by collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 1410.
Many professional employees or white-collar employees have no desire to be
represented by labor unions. Id. at 1410-11. Thus, as Blades comments, "[A]
generally satisfactory solution to the problem of the abusive exercise of em-
ployer power does not lie in recourse to labor unionism." Id. at 1411. See also
Minda, The Common Law of Employment at-Will in New York: The Paralysis of Nine-
teenth Century Doctrine, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 939, 948 (1985) (collective bargain-
ing is relevant to only one-third of work force).
25. Ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-162 (1982)).
26. See Peirce, supra note 11, at 8. The Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the statute in Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Brotherhood Ry. & S.S.
Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930). In Texas &New Orleans, the Court stated that Con-
gress' concern in enacting the legislation was to prohibit interference in either
party's selection of a bargaining representative. Id. at 570-71. The court stated
that the purpose of the RLA is distinguishable from the regulation in Adair and
Coppage, which was held to interfere with the employer's right to select or dis-
charge his employees. Id. at 571. For a discussion of the holdings of Adair and
Coppage, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of the enactment of the NLRA, see supra notes 20-21
and accompanying text.
28. For a discussion of such legislative activity, see infra notes 29-36 and
accompanying text.
29. Statutory protections in the United States against wrongful dismissal
have not been embodied in any general statutory form. H. PERRITr, supra note
15, § 2.1, at 26. Regulation of the employment relationship has developed
through individual statutory laws extending protection to employees based on
their class characteristics or their conduct. Id. One writer suggests that such a
statutory scheme represents a desire to restrict the power of the employer to
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pie, title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196430 protects against
employment discrimination on the basis of sex, color, religion, or na-
tional origin. By the same token, classes of employees such as veter-
ans, 3 1 the handicapped,3 2 public employees,3 3  the aged,3 4 and
debtors3 5 are statutorily protected against wrongful discharge. Legisla-
tive activity in other areas has afforded the employee protection against
discharge based on employee conduct, but again is limited to certain
types of conduct.3 6
Unfortunately, the aforementioned legislation, though widely liti-
gated, does not encompass the average employee at will, leaving him
without a statutory remedy if he is terminated by his employer in a capri-
cious manner.3 7
terminate, not because of a direct concern with the dismissal power of an em-
ployer, but as a means to effectuate or implement other policies. Note, supra
note 22, at 1447.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). See also Greenbaum, Toward a Common Law of
Employment Discrimination, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 65, 85-96 (1985) (general discussion of
state and federal employment discrimination statutes).
31. See, e.g., Veterans Reemployment Act, 38 U.S.C. § 2021(c)(1) (1982)
(military personnel are guaranteed right to employment upon completion of ser-
vice); CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 394 (West 1955) (no employer may discharge
any person from employment because of military duty).
32. See, e.g., Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1982) (guidelines
for hiring and termination of handicapped persons).
33. See, e.g., Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (1982) (pub-
lic employees are entitled to notice and other procedures prior to termination);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.807 (Purdon Supp. 1985) (no civil employee shall
be removed except for just cause).
34. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.
§ 623 (1982) (employer may not discharge or otherwise discriminate against em-
ployee on basis of age).
35. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1647(a) (1982)
(no employer may discharge employee by reason of fact that employee's earn-
ings are subject to garnishment); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-584 (1984) (employer
cannot terminate employee because of garnishment of employee's earnings by
creditor).
36. See H. PERRITr, supra note 15, § 2.1, at 26; Note, supra note 22, at 1447.
For example, employers cannot discharge employees because they file com-
plaints against their employers under certain statutes or because they engage in
union activities. See, e.g., Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C.
§ 660(c) (1982) (preventing retaliatory discharge of employee for filing com-
plaint against employer). For a discussion of the NLRA prohibition against em-
ployer discharges of employees for union activities, see supra notes 20-21 and
accompanying text.
37. See Note, supra note 19, at 707 (statutory protection is only for select
groups of workers).
One possible exception to the legislative scheme described above is found
in Pennsylvania, where the state legislature is currently considering a bill that
would provide all employees with a process to seek redress when they have been
dismissed without just cause. Unjust Dismissal Act, H.B. 1020, 169th Gen. Ass.,
1985 Sess. (Pa.). The proposed bill, currently before the committee on labor
relations, would require an employer who dismisses an employee to give notice
to that employee of the reasons for dismissal and of the opportunity to exercise
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3. Tort Restrictions on the Employment at Will Doctrine
A third restriction on the employment at will doctrine is found in
the employee's ability to prevent discharge at the will of the employer
through causes of action in tort. There are several methods of limiting
the doctrine in this fashion. 3 8 Courts have attempted to remedy the
harshness of the employment at will doctrine by recognizing causes of
action based on tortious interference with employment relations,3 9 defa-
mation,40 privacy,4 1 fraudulent misrepresentation, 42 and traditional
his procedural rights under the act. Id. The grievance may then be settled
through an arbitration proceeding that would be binding and enforceable on
both the employer and employee. Id. See Decker, At-Will Employment in Penn-
sylvania-A Proposal for Its Abolition and Statutory Regulation, 87 DIcK. L. REV. 477,
489-92 (1983) (general discussion of Unjust Dismissal Act, which was intro-
duced as Pennsylvania House Bill 1742 in the 1981 legislative session); Com-
ment, Employment-At-Will in Pennsylvania: Employee Manuals Provide Contract
Remedies For Discharged Employees, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 243, 249-50 (1985) (discussion
of House Bill 1742 and problems dealing with large volume of arbitration re-
quired by just cause requirement).
38. Not only have traditional torts such as negligence, invasion of privacy,
and defamation gained renewed significance in the context of the employment
relationship because of the focus on the employment at will doctrine, many
courts have given attention to new tort theories such as breach of public policy.
See Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of 100 Years of Employer Privilege, 21
IDAHO L. REV. 201, 225-54 (1985).
39. See, e.g.., Campbell v. Ford Indus., 274 Or. 243, 252 n.8, 546 P.2d 141,
147 n.8 (1976) (while employment relation for indefinite term is generally termi-
nable at will, interference by third party with that relation is nonetheless actiona-
ble). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979) (statement of
general rule regarding intentional interference with contractual relations by
third persons).
40. See, e.g., Poledna v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 360 Mich. 129, 134-36, 103
N.W.2d 789, 790-792 (1960) (employee suit against employer for defamation
where employer's statement that he would fire plaintiff for theft was overheard
by other employees); Banas v. Matthews Int'l Corp., 502 A.2d 637, 638-44 (Pa.
Super. 1985) (employee brought suit against employer for defamation where
employer made statements to management and plaintiff's fellow workers that
plaintiff was thief and committed unlawful acts). Contra Biggins v. Hanson, 252
Cal. App. 2d 16, 19-20, 59 Cal. Rptr. 897, 899 (1967) (employer granted new
trial where employee brought libel action based on inter-office memorandum
discharging employee for disloyalty, insubordination, and for threatening to
sabotage company equipment). For a discussion of the use of defamation princi-
ples in the context of employment at will, see H. PERRIT, supra note 15, § 5.22, at
207-09.
41. See, e.g., Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 301-02, 431 N.E.2d
908, 909 (1982) (employees' suit for invasion of privacy where employer dis-
charged plaintiffs for failing to fill out questionnaire containing personal ques-
tions). For a discussion of the use of privacy principles in the context of
employment at will, see H. PERRIT, supra note 15, § 5.23, at 209-13.
42. See, e.g., Hall v. Integon Life Ins. Co., 454 So. 2d 1338 (Ala. 1984) (no
wrongful dismissal cause of action; however, employee was entitled to trial on
fraudulent misrepresentation claim based on oral statements that employee
would not be terminated except for gross misconduct, even though written pro-
visions reserved right to terminate at will). For a discussion of the use of fraudu-
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negligence principles. 4 3 One of the more extreme examples of a restric-
tion on the employment at will doctrine based on a tort cause of action is
found in Agis v. Howard Johnson Co. ,44 where the Massachusetts Supreme
Court applied the theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 45
In Agis, the court held liable a restaurant manager who threatened a
number of employees with discharge in order to find out who was steal-
ing from the restaurant.4 6
While these theories have been relied on by some abusively dis-
charged employees, in recent years the prevailing tort theory applied in
wrongful discharge cases has been the "public policy tort."'4 7 In such
cases, an employer's tort liability is predicated on a finding that the em-
ployer's actions toward the employee threaten some important public
policy. 48 In general, three types of situations are embraced by the pub-
lent misrepresentation in the context of employment at will, see H. PERRrrr,
supra note 15, § 5.21, at 205-07.
43. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Bissell, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Mich.
1982) (employer held negligent for failure to inform employee of potential of
being terminated in light of standards set forth in employment handbook).
44. 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976).
45. Intentional infliction of emotional distress is classically defined as
follows:
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or reck-
lessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability
for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from
it, for such bodily harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
46. 371 Mass. at 145, 355 N.E.2d at 319. The manager discharged wait-
resses in alphabetical order until he could discover who was stealing from the
company. Id. at 141, 355 N.E.2d at 317. See also Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co.,
604 F. Supp. 229, 237 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (where plaintiff was harassed concerning
interracial relationship prior to termination, claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress survived motion to dismiss); Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g Corp., 2
Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970) (en banc) (employer who
maligned plaintiffs race when firing him was liable for intentional infliction of
emotional distress); Murray v. Bridgeport Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 56, 480 A.2d
610 (1984) (where employer failed to conduct job performance evaluation,
plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress survived motion to
strike).
47. Mauk, supra note 38, at 226. The term "public policy" embodies both
statutory and common law. Id. at 228. Courts hearing employment personnel
actions in recent years have indicated that they are prepared to recognize tort
claims based upon the discharge of an at will employee for reasons that contra-
vene statutory or other established public policy. Id. While the contours of the
public policy exception to the at will doctrine are not clearly defined, the new
tort promises to significantly change the legal rights of employees. Id. at 228-29.
See also H. PERRITr, supra note 15, §§ 5.7-.17, at 175-98; Heshizer, supra note 18,
at 10 1-03; Murg & Scharman, supra note 15, at 343-355; Note, Wrongful Discharge,
supra note 3, at 1822-24; Note, supra note 19, at 708-11.
48. H. PERRITr, supra note 15, at 175. In deciding whether the discharge of
an employee is actionable, a court must weigh the clarity of the threatened pub-
lic policy against the value of maintaining the employment at will doctrine.
Heshizer, supra note 18, at 101. The many courts that recognize the public pol-
icy tort vary greatly in their application of this balancing analysis. Id. These
11
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lic policy tort: first, where an employee is discharged for exercising a
right under a constitution or statute; 49 second, where an employee is
discharged for refusing to disobey a law at the request of the em-
ployer;50 and third, where the employee is discharged for protesting ac-
tions by the employer that violate the law.5 ' The availability of public
variations exist because states will differ as to the exact formulation of public
policy, and therefore they will differ on how substantial or clear a public policy
consideration must be before the employment at will doctrine may be aban-
doned. Id.
49. The leading case involving the exercise of a statutory right by an em-
ployee is Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 206 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425
(1973). In Frampton, the company terminated the plaintiff after she filed and
received a settlement on her workman's compensation claim. Id. at 250, 297
N.E.2d at 426. The court held that if employers are permitted to fire employees
for filing such claims, then the ability to rely on the Workman's Compensation
Act would be lost. Id. at 251, 297 N.E.2d at 428.
Other cases have imposed wrongful discharge liability on employers for
contravening an employee's statutory right to serve on a jury, the right to re-
ceive minimum wages, and the right to protect pension rights. See, e.g.,
Savodnick v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (right to protect
pension benefits); Montalvo v. Zamora, 7 Cal. App. 3d 69, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401
(1970) (right to minimum wages);Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho
330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977) (right to pension); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536
P.2d 512 (1975) (right to serve on jury); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255
Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978) (right to serve on jury). But cf. Martin v.
Tapley, 360 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978) (employee could be discharged for filing and
receiving workman's compensation despite existence of employment contract
referring to workman's compensation law).
The Third Circuit, applying Pennsylvania law, recently concluded in Novosel
v. Nationwide Ins. Co. that despite the absence of a statutory declaration, an em-
ployee may have a cause of action in tort under an expression of public policy
derived from a state or federal constitution. 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983). In
Novosel, the plaintiff was discharged after several years of service for his refusal
to participate in a lobbying effort to enact state legislation favorable to the em-
ployer. Id. at 896. The court held that although no statutory law protected the
right of political expression, both the Pennsylvania Constitution and the federal
Constitution, in their protection of free speech, provided the plaintiff with a
cause of action based on a violation of public policy. Id. at 898-901.
50. The California Supreme Court has relied on this public policy limita-
tion on the at will doctrine. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167,
610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980). In Tameny, an employee refused to
participate in his employer's price fixing scheme and was terminated as a result.
Id. at 169, 610 P.2d at 1331, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 840. The court found that the
objectives underlying state penal statutes regarding price fixing require recogni-
tion of a rule preventing an employer from terminating an employee for simply
doing what was legal. Id. at 176, 610 P.2d at 1333-34, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844. See
also Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 337 S.E.2d 213 (S.C. 1985) (at will
employee may sue employer when employer requires employee to violate law by
refusing to obey subpoena issued by South Carolina Employment Security Com-
mission); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (termination
of employee for refusing to make illegal loan charges violates public policy).
Contra Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977) (plaintiff
fired for refusing to falsify patient's medical records; court held that concept of
imposing liability for violation of public policy is too vague).
51. In these cases, known as "whistle blower" cases, courts must balance
346 [Vol. 31: p. 335
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policy tort theory, however, like the use of collective bargaining and
other statutory remedies, falls short of total protection for the capri-
ciously or abusively discharged employee.
52
4. Contractual Restrictions on the Employment At Will Doctrine
A fourth limitation placed on the employment at will doctrine in-
volves the imposition of liability on the employer for breach of con-
tract. 53 Prior to the 1950's, a breach of contract theory could not be
used to overcome application of the doctrine when the term of employ-
ment was indefinite unless the employee benefited from a collective bar-
gaining agreement. 54 The primary reason courts refused to overcome
the employment at will doctrine based on principles of breach of con-
tract was that employers and employees failed to bargain for or negoti-
ate about job security. 55 Many courts, however, believing that the
failure to bargain for job security is the product of the employees' lack
of bargaining power, have taken a more active role in limiting the em-
the employer's expectations of loyalty against the employee's concern that com-
pany policy is improper. Heshizer, supra note 18, at 102.
In one New Jersey Supreme Court case, an employee conducted research
for a new drug that she believed might be carcinogenic. Pierce v. Ortho Phar-
maceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980). Her employer wished to test
the drug on human subjects. Id. at 60, 417 A.2d at 507. The employer dis-
charged the employee when she expressed her concerns that the testing was
unwise. Id. The court held that such a dismissal is contrary to the clear mandate
of public policy emanating from state legislation, administrative rules, and judi-
cial decisions. Id. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512. See also Palmateer v. International
Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (discharge of employee
after he informed authorities about co-employee who was selling stolen goods
violated public policy). Contra Hostettler v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 624 F.
Supp. 169 (S.D. Ind. 1985) (at will employee cannot maintain action against em-
ployer for "whistle-blowing"; only public policy tort based on exercise of statu-
tory right is recognized); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319
A.2d 174 (1974) (discharge of employees after they notified employer that un-
safe product was being marketed does not violate public policy).
52. Murg & Scharman, supra note 15, at 355. For example, many courts
limit the recovery based on public policy tort theory to cases in which the plain-
tiff's claim is based on an explicit statement by the legislature regarding the em-
ployee's acts. Id.
53. For additional discussion of the contractual aspects of the employment
at will doctrine, see Mauk, supra note 38; Note, Employee Handbooks and Employ-
ment-at-Will Contracts, 1985 DUKE L.J. 196.
54. While the use of collective bargaining to circumvent the employment at
will doctrine involves contract theory, the impact of collective bargaining on the
employment at will rule has been discussed above. See supra notes 19-24 and
accompanying text. This discussion concerns the contract rights of non-union
employees who typically do not enjoy the benefits of a collectively bargained
agreement.
55. Note, Wrongful Discharge, supra note 3, at 1828-36. Adherence to the
employment at will rule reflects the court's general reluctance to interfere with
the determination of the substantive terms that result from contractual bargain-
ing. Id. at 1828.
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ployment at will doctrine under a contract analysis. 56 This analysis be-
gins by treating the doctrine as a rule of construction rather than as a
substantive limitation on contract formation. 57 From there, courts have
developed several different contract theories that enable the employee
to limit the harshness of the employment at will doctrine.5 8
a. Employer's Promise of Continued Employment as
a Contractual Limitation
The use of contract law has been successfully relied on by dis-
charged employees where the court finds some type of promise, express
or implied, made by the employer, that prevents the application of the
employment at will doctrine. For example, some courts have relied on
an implied in law covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 59 In Fortune v.
National Cash Register Co. ,60 the court awarded the plaintiff commissions
from sales he made during his employment based on a general require-
ment of good faith and fair dealing between parties to all contracts. 6 1
56. Id. at 1816-17. The justification for judicial intervention in the contrac-
tual process is that the employer's superior bargaining power allows him to offer
a job on a "take it or leave it" basis, with no opportunity for negotiation. Id. at
1828. One commentator, however, has suggested that the need for judicial in-
tervention is based on inefficiency rather than unfairness. Id. at 1830. High
transaction costs associated with the employer having to bargain individually
with his employees discourage complete negotiation in the employment context.
Id.
57. Many courts relying on the employment handbook as a limitation on
the employment at will doctrine have provided a thorough analysis of the treat-
ment of the employment at will doctrine as a rule of construction. For a discus-
sion of recent case law involving employment handbooks, where the court has
treated the doctrine as a rule of construction, see infra notes 174-76 and accom-
panying text.
58. Case law suggests that contract principles have limited the employment
at will doctrine in two ways. First, courts have developed a number of contract
theories in order to find a promise by the employer to provide employment ten-
ure. H. PERRIrr, supra note 15, § 4.6, at 128. For a discussion of contract theo-
ries dealing with the employer's promise, see infra notes 59-71 and
accompanying text. Second, courts have applied principles of bargained for
consideration and promissory estoppel in order to find an agreement limiting
the employer's ability to discharge arbitrarily. See H. PERRITr, supra note 15,
§§ 4.11-.14. For a discussion of theories dealing with bargained for considera-
tion and promissory estoppel, see infra notes 72-86 and accompanying text.
59. Comment, supra note 3, at 127-28. The covenant is essentially a "court-
imposed obligation to refrain from interfering arbitrarily with the employee's
enjoyment of the benefits of his employment." Id. at 127.
60. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). The employer promised plain-
tiff, a machine salesman, a commission or cash bonuses for all machines sold as a
result of his efforts. Id. at 97-98, 364 N.E.2d at 1253. Plaintiff only received
756 of the bonuses he was entitled to when the employer discharged him with-
out further payment. Id. at 99, 364 N.E.2d at 1254.
61. Id. at 102, 364 N.E.2d at 1256. The Fortune court, relying on the Uni-
form Commercial Code, set the stage for other courts to apply covenants of
good faith and fair dealing. Id. (citing U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977) (every contract
within U.C.C. carries obligation of good faith in its performance or enforce-
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An implied in law covenant has also been relied on in cases involving a
violation of public policy.6 2 In Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet,63 the Wis-
consin Supreme Court upheld a cause of action for breach of an implied
covenant where plaintiff refused to submit a report concerning the ter-
mination of his secretary that would cover up discriminatory actions
taken by the company against the secretary.64
A second example of an employer's promise limiting the employ-
ment at will doctrine is a promise implied from the employee's length of
service. 65 In Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc. ,66 the California Court of Appeals
stated that, in determining whether an implied in fact promise of contin-
ued employment exists, the employee's longevity of service can be
considered.6 7
A third situation where courts have found an enforceable promise is
where the employer's representations indicate either an express or an
implied in fact promise regarding job security. 68 These representations
may be communicated in a variety of ways. Specifically, the employer
may state company policy through employment manuals,6 9 memoranda
ment)). See Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722 (1980) (court concluded that employment contracts, like all contracts, in-
clude implicit covenant of good faith and fair dealing). But see Satterfield v.
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359, 1363-65 (D.S.C. 1985) (im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to commercial cases);
Murphy v. American Home Prods., Inc., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983) (court refused to imply covenant of good faith and fair
dealing inconsistently with other terms in contractual relationship).
62. See Note, At Will Employment-Contractual Limitation of an Employer's Right
to Terminate, 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 463, 471-72 (1984) (comparing implied covenant
not to violate public policy with more general implied covenant to act in good
faith).
63. 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
64. Id. at 565, 335 N.W.2d at 836. See also Petermann v. International Bhd.
of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (employee refusal to
follow instructions of employer to commit perjury); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceu-
tical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980) (both contract and tort cause of
action existed where employee was terminated for expressing opinion of carci-
nogenic nature of drug being tested on human subjects). For a discussion of the
"public policy tort," see supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
65. See H. PERRiTr, supra note 15, § 4.8; Note, supra note 12, at 361-66.
66. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981). The plaintiff in Pugh
had been employed by the defedant for 32 years when he was discharged with-
out explanation. Id. at 315, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
67. Id. at 327, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925. Pugh suggests that length of service
may be a factor. Id. However, length of service alone may not be enough to find
an enforceable promise by the employer. See, e.g., Sprott v. Avon Prods., Inc.,
596 F. Supp. 178, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (length of services does not overcome
employment at will rule).
68. See H. PERRrrr, supra note 15, § 4.7; Note, Challenging the Employment at
Will Doctrine Through Modern Contract Theory, 16 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 449, 459-64
(1983); Note, supra note 12, at 356-58.
69. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d
880 (1980) (employer's policy statements, either oral or written in handbook,
1986] NOTE 349
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to employees, 70 or oral statements. 7 '
b. Validation of Employer's Promise of Continued Employment:
Bargained For Consideration and Promissory Estoppel
Modern courts have played an active role in limiting the employ-
ment at will doctrine not only in recognizing an employer's promise re-
garding job security, but also by developing several theories regarding
the validation of that promise. 72 The validation devices that have played
a significant role in the employment relationship-consideration 73 and
may form basis of employment contract requiring termination only upon just
cause); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983) (re-
straints on termination of employees found in employee handbook are contrac-
tually binding on employer); Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284,
491 A.2d 1257 (implied promise in employment manual that employee will be
fired only for cause is enforceable against employer), modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499
A.2d 515 (1985). For a discussion of the use of employment manuals or hand-
books to create an express or implied in fact term in an employment contract,
see infra notes 87-111 and accompanying text.
70. See Brawthen v. H & R. Block, Inc., 28 Cal. App. 3d 131, 104 Cal. Rptr.
486 (1972) (plaintiff claimed that he was wrongfully terminated where defendant
circulated printed sheet indicating that no manager need worry about employ-
ment if he or she is doing good job); Staggs v. Blue Cross, Inc., 61 Md. App.
381, 486 A.2d 798 (personnel policy memorandum setting forth procedures in-
volving employee counseling sessions, which were to be followed prior to termi-
nation, may give rise to employer's contractual obligation), cert. denied, 303 Md.
295, 493 A.2d 349 (1985).
71. See Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 779 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1985) (court
held enforceable employer's oral statement that employee would be terminated
only for just cause if employee transferred from San Francisco to New York);
Eales v. Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical Group, Inc., 663 P.2d 958 (Alaska
1983) (court recognized plaintiff's contract rights against employer where plain-
tiff was terminated after being told by employer that he would not be discharged
as long as he performed his duties); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408
Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980) (statement to plaintiffs that they would be
with company as long as they satisfactorily performed their jobs was contractu-
ally enforceable promise). But see Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 263 Minn. 520,
117 N.W.2d 213 (1962) (employer, in formulating company retirement plan,
stated that no one would be dismissed as long as they showed willingness to
work and learn; court held that statement evinced no intent to contract and
therefore was not binding on employer).
72. A validation device is defined as any device that makes a promise en-
forceable. J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 58 (2d ed. 1974). There are
essentially four validation devices involved in contract law: 1) consideration;
2) promissory estoppel or detrimental reliance; 3) the seal; and 4) moral obliga-
tion. Id.
73. Consideration is composed of two elements: sufficient legal value and
bargained for exchange. J. MURRAY, supra note 72, § 73. The legal value neces-
sary for the formation of the contract involves either a benefit to the promisor or
detriment to the promisee. Id. This benefit or detriment must then be dealt
with by the parties to the agreement as the agreed price or exchange for the
promise. Id. See also J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 4-1, at 134-35 (2d
ed. 1977) (essence of consideration is legal detriment that has been bargained
for and exchanged for promise).
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promissory estoppel74 -are discussed below.
The contract principles of additional consideration 7 5 and mutuality
of obligation 76 have fostered the historic development of the employ-
ment at will rule. Under principles of consideration adhered to in nine-
teenth and early twentieth century contract law, employees provided
labor and services to an employer in exchange for the salary received. 77
If an employee wished to make his employment arrangement binding
for a fixed period of time, he was required to provide the employer with
additional consideration. 78
74. The doctrine of promissory estoppel allows a promisee to enforce a
gratuitous promise made by the promisor that a promisee relies on. J. MURRAY,
supra note 72, § 93, at 203. Promissory estoppel is defined by the Second Restate-
ment of Contracts in this manner:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce ac-
tion or forebearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and
which does induce such action or forebearance is binding if injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
75. For a discussion of the meaning of the term "additional consideration,"
see infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
76. The principle of mutuality of obligation requires that in order for a bi-
lateral agreement to be enforceable, both promises must be binding or neither is
binding. J. MURRAY, supra note 72, § 90, at 191. See alsoJ. CALAMARI &J. PE-
RILLO, supra note 73, § 4-14 (doctrine of mutuality expressed in phrase that
"both parties must be bound or neither is bound").
77. Note, supra note 12, at 351-52.
78. Id. at 352. The rationale for the requirement of added consideration is
that by providing additional consideration the employee has purchased the right
to employment of a definite term by conferring a benefit upon his employer
greater than the value of his services. Note, supra note 19, at 704. Moreover, by
providing additional consideration, the employee has suffered a detriment suffi-
cient to establish an independent contract of a fixed duration. Id. Several cases
have held that the presence of additional consideration is sufficient to form a
binding term employment agreement. See, e.g., Alabama Mills, Inc. v. Smith, 237
Ala. 296, 186 So. 699 (1939) (plaintiffs resignation from present employment to
take new employment, where new employer has knowledge of resignation, held
sufficient consideration); Stauter v. Walnut Grove Prods., 188 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa
1971) (plaintiff's sale of business to defendant in exchange for employment held
sufficient additional consideration).
In many cases, however, the courts have not found sufficient additional con-
sideration to allow the employee to recover. See, e.g., Lord v. Goldberg, 81 Cal.
569, 22 P. 1126 (1889) (employee's promise to provide certain amount of sales
was not sufficient additional consideration to vacate contractual right to contin-
ued employment where employee failed to produce requisite amount of sales);
Rasnick v. W.M. Ritter Lumber Co., 187 Ky. 523, 219 S.W. 801 (1920) (agree-
ment of employee to drop law suit against company was not sufficient considera-
tion to support contract of employment). Also, in several cases where an
employee has provided additional consideration, courts have refused to grant
relief because the employer received no benefit despite the employee's detri-
ment. See, e.g., Rape v. Mobile & Ohio R.R., 136 Miss. 38, 100 So. 585 (1924)
(substantial moving expenses incurred by employee's change of employment
not sufficient additional consideration); Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis.
2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967) (sale of farm in order to return to work for
previous employer was not sufficient additional consideration).
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The principle of mutuality of obligation,7 9 applied in the employ-
ment context, results in the conclusion that if an employee is not obli-
gated to continue providing services to an employer, the employer
should not be obligated to continue providing employment.8 0 This rea-
soning led many courts to conclude that where an employee may leave
his job at any time, any agreement imposing a duty on the employer as
to the employee's term of employment lacks mutuality of obligation, and
hence, the employment is for an indefinite period and is terminable at
will.8 1
In recent years, many courts and commentators have criticized the
doctrines of additional consideration and mutuality of obligation and
raised doubts about their applicability to the employment relation-
ship.8 2 This mounting criticism has played a significant role in enabling
an employee to validate an employer's promise of continuing employ-
ment through bargained for consideration in order to overcome the em-
ployment at will doctrine. 83
79. For a definition of mutuality of obligation, see supra note 76.
80. See Blades, supra note 18, at 1419-24; Murg & Scharman, supra note 15,
at 337; Comment, supra note 1, at 220; Note, supra note 19, at 702; Note, Wrong-
ful Discharge, supra note 3, at 1819.
81. See, e.g., Clarke v. Atlantic Stevedoring Co., 163 F. 423 (C.C.E.D.N.Y.
1908); Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, 174 La. 66, 139 So. 760 (1932);
Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich. 684, 273 N.W. 315 (1937); Kiser v. Amalga-
mated Clothing Workers, 169 Va. 574, 194 S.E. 727 (1938).
82. One commentator points out that the doctrine of mutuality of obliga-
tion has been variously interpreted and applied by the courts with results that
have been inconsistent with other well settled principles of the law of considera-
tion. J. MURRAY, supra note 72, § 90, at 191. In certain cases the doctrine has
been held to require that the undertaking of the promise relied upon as consid-
eration must be equivalent to the undertaking of the promise that it supports
before it can constitute consideration. Id. Requiring mutuality in this sense is
not necessary because of the accepted doctrine that the law will not inquire into
the adequacy of consideration. Id. at 195. Thus, the doctrine of mutuality of
obligation is not supported by most of the actual decisions in contract law and
the concept should be disavowed. Id. See Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333
N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983) ("demand for mutuality of obligation, although
appealing in its symmetry, is simply a species of the forbidden inquiry into the
adequacy of consideration").
The requirement of additional consideration involves the same problem as
mutuality of obligation. When a court requires the employee to provide consid-
eration beyond his labor and services, where that employee receives not only a
salary, but a promise of continued employment as well, the court is improperly
inquiring into the adequacy of consideration. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.,
116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 325-26, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 924-25 (1981). The court in
Pugh stated that "there is no analytical reason why an employee's promise to
render services, or his actual rendition of services over time, may not support an
employer's promise both to pay a particular wage (for example) and to refrain
from arbitrary dismissal." Id. at 325, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925 (citing A. CORBIN, IA
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 125, 152 (1963)).
83. H. PERRIr, supra note 15, § 4.11, at 138-42. Under a unilateral con-
tract analysis, the employer's promise of continued employment may be ex-
pressed through, for instance, some representation made by the employer. Id.
18
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Where an employee cannot establish bargained for consideration in
order to validate an employer's promise, the courts have also recognized
the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 8 4 In 1981, for example, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court in Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc. ,85 allowed an
employee to recover damages for lost income based on the doctrine of
promissory estoppel when he resigned from his job in reliance on a job
offer from the defendant.8 6 Thus, the modern courts' treatment of con-
tract law in the employment context has extended to all areas of contract
analysis.
B. Employment Handbooks and the Employment at Will Doctrine
The harshness of the employment at will doctrine has led to several
limitations being placed upon the doctrine, a primary illustration of
which is an express or implied in fact term of a contract that restricts
employee dismissals. 8 7 While promises of job security may be derived
from oral representations made by the employer, in many situations the
employer's policies regarding termination are stated in an employment
handbook; 88 and it is the terms of the handbook that create the
at 142. Without a requirement of mutuality of obligation or additional consider-
ation, the employee can make the promise enforceable simply by continuing in
his or her regular employment obligations. Id. For a more detailed discussion
of unilateral contract principles as applied to employer promises contained in an
employment handbook, see infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
84. Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Serv., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 487, 492 (W.D. Ark.
1982). Promissory estoppel has always been recognized as a substitute for con-
sideration. Id. It prevents an employer "who has failed to act from claiming a
right to the detriment of his [employee] when the latter is entitled to rely on the
words or actions of the former and has in fact so relied to his detriment." Id.
For the definition of promissory estoppel, see supra note 74.
85. 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981).
86. Id. at 115. In Grouse, the plaintiff worked as a pharmacist before quit-
ting his job to accept a new position with the defendant. Id. However, the em-
ployer hired another person before the plaintiff could begin working for the
defendant. Id. As a result, the defendant did not have a position to offer plain-
tiff. Id. Accord Collins v. Parsons College, 203 N.W.2d 594 (Iowa 1973) (binding
contract exists between employee and employer where employee gave up secure
job to take new position); Rowe v. Noren Pattern & Foundry Co., 91 Mich. App.
254, 283 N.W.2d 713 (1979) (employee who gives up job sufficiently relies on
employer's offer of employment to impose duty on employer to terminate only
for just cause). But see Milligan v. Union Corp., 87 Mich. App. 179, 274 N.W.2d
10 (1978) (employee's forbearance of opportunity to find employment else-
where prior to beginning work with defendant was not sufficient reliance to im-
pose duty on new employer); Goldstein v. Kern, 82 Mich. App. 723, 267 N.W.2d
165 (1978) (plaintiffs rejection of other job offers was necessary step in begin-
ning employment with defendant); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash.
2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977) (employee's rejection of other job offers was not
sufficient reliance to change at will status of employee).
87. For a discussion of express or implied in fact contracts based on an
employer's representations of company policy, see supra notes 68-71 and accom-
panying text.
88. For a discussion of the use of employment handbooks by employers to
19
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contract.8 9
The courts' willingness to bind the employer to terms found in the
handbook has often been expressed in the context of benefits received
by the employee such as severence pay,90 vacation pay,9 1 and tenure. 92
Where the terms of the handbook have provided a basis for limiting the
employment at will doctrine, however, the contractual agreement be-
tween the employer and employee is typically derived from either
1) statements that refer to a "just cause" requirement or 2) statements
indicating that administrative procedures must be followed prior to
termination. 9 3
set forth company policies and procedures, see H. PERRIrr, supra note 15,
§§ 8.1-8.14.
89. There is a split of authority as to whether employment handbooks can
create an implied in fact or express term of a contract that limits the conditions
upon which an employer may terminate an employee. For a survey of the cases
that are split on the issue, see supra note 9.
90. See Anthony v.Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 51 N.J. Super. 139, 142,
143 A.2d 762, 763 (1958). In Anthony, an employer gave his employees a book-
let titled "general rules." Id. at 142, 143 A.2d at 763. In this booklet, the em-
ployer stated that severance pay would be issued to members of a certain class of
employees, which included the plaintiff, upon termination. Id. The court held
that the statement constituted an offer that could be accepted by an employee by
continued performance at work. Id. at 143, 143 A.2d at 764. In Anthony, contin-
ued performance did in fact bind the employer. Id. See also Dahl v. Brunswick
Corp., 277 Md. 471, 356 A.2d 221 (1976) (employer's written policy statements
concerning severance pay constitute unilateral contract that is accepted by em-
ployees continuing work); Cain v. Allen Elec. & Equip. Co., 346 Mich. 568, 78
N.W.2d 296 (1956) (personnel policy adopted by board of directors relating to
severance pay constituted offer that was accepted by employee by continuing to
work); Hinkeldey v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 470 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1971) (employer
providing employee with document containing company policy regarding sever-
ance is bound to unilateral contract thereby formed); Dangott v. ASG Indus.,
558 P.2d 379 (Okla. 1976) (employer providing employee with statement of
company policy regarding severance pay forms bilateral contract with employee,
even though employee is without actual knowledge of provisions); Demerath v.
Nestle Co., 121 Wis. 2d 194, 358 N.W.2d 541 (Ct. App. 1984) (terms regarding
severance pay in personnel policy were contractually binding on employer after
employer sold company).
91. See Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54
(1977) (provisions in employment handbook regarding vacation time are part of
employment contract); Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct. App.
1976) (personnel policy extending benefits regarding vacation time may be con-
strued as unilateral offer accepted by employee's continued performance).
92. See Knowles v. Unity College, 429 A.2d 220 (Me. 1981) (terms of con-
tract involving tenure may be derived from passages in faculty handbook).
93. Decker, Handbooks and Employment Policies as Express or Implied Guarantees of
Employment-Employer Beware! 5J.L. & COMM. 207, 210-15 (1984). For example,
in Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, a discharged employee successfully main-
tained a breach of contract action based on statements in an employment hand-
book that it was the "policy" of the company to release employees "for just
cause only." 408 Mich. 579, 598, 292 N.W.2d 880, 884 (1980). In Pine River
State Bank v. Mettille, an employee alleged a breach of contract based on his em-
ployer's failure to follow a three-stage termination procedure that included cer-
tain requirements in the first two stages followed by termination in the third
20
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Many courts have used a unilateral contract analysis9 4 to find a con-
tract where an employer supplies an employee with an employment
handbook containing either a just cause provision or termination proce-
dures.9 5 For example, if an employer provides an employee with an em-
ployment handbook, the employer has made an offer for a unilateral
contract.96 The employee may accept the offer by continuing to work
stage. 333 N.W.2d 622, 626 (Minn. 1983). See also Leikvold v. Valley View Com-
munity Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 170 (1984) (en banc) (termination proce-
dures); Staggs v. Blue Cross, Inc., 61 Md. App. 381, 486 A.2d 798 (termination
procedures), cert. denied, 303 Md. 349, 493 A.2d 349 (1985); Southwest Gas
Corp. v. Ahmad, 99 Nev. 594, 668 P.2d 261 (1983) (just cause provision); Wool-
ley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (just cause provi-
sion), modified, 101 N.J. 10, 489 A.2d 515 (1985); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc.,
57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441,457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982) (just cause provision);
Yartzoff v. Democrat-Herald Publishing Co., 281 Or. 651, 576 P.2d 356 (1978)
(termination procedures); Osterkamp v. Alkota Mfg., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 275 (S.D.
1983) (termination procedures).
While just cause provisions and termination procedures have provided the
basis for finding an employment contract in most cases, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania, in Banas v. Matthews Int'l Corp., recently addressed the issue of
whether a specific provision in a handbook, which does not deal with the dura-
tion of employment, may create a limitation on the employment at will doctrine.
502 A.2d 637 (Pa. Super. 1985). In Banas, a company terminated an employee
for his use of its equipment. Id. at 638. The employee alleged that a breach of
contract resulted from his discharge because a provision in his employment
handbook stated that an employee may use company equipment with company
approval. Id. For a further discussion of Banas, see infra notes 154-63 and ac-
companying text.
94. A unilateral contract is formed where there is one promisor and one
promisee. J. MURRAY, supra note 72, § 6, at 10 (footnote omitted). The prom-
isor manifests his intention that he does not wish a promise in exchange for his
own promise, but rather performance. Id. at 10-11. The contract is formed
when the promisee completes performance. Id. at 11. Thus, when the contract
is formed, the promisee gains a right and the promisor owes a duty. Id.
The unilateral contract analysis should be distinguished from the bilateral
contract analysis, where the parties to a contract exchange promises. Id. at 10.
The bilateral contract is formed as soon as the promises are exchanged. Id.
Thus, at the point where the contract is formed, there are two outstanding obli-
gations since both promises remain to be performed. Id.
95. See, e.g., Wagner v. Sperry Univac, 458 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1978),
aff'd, 624 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir. 1980); Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp.,
141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 170 (1984) (en banc); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Pine River State Bank v. Met-
tille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 99 Nev.
594, 668 P.2d 261 (1983); Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491
A.2d 1257, modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985); Langdon v. Saga Corp.,
569 P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976); Yartzoff v. Democrat-Herald Publishing
Co., 281 Or. 651, 576 P.2d 356 (1978); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102
Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).
96. See Penn River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn.
1983) (promise of employment under particular terms of unspecified duration
found in handbook may constitute offer); Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524,
527-28 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976) (terms of offer are policies contained in hand-
book). See also Note, supra note 53, at 212-13 (handbook provisions must be
specifically stated to show intent by employer to make offer).
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for the employer. 9 7 The validation device that makes the employer's
promise enforceable is either 1) the consideration derived from the ex-
change of the employer's promise to abide by the terms of the contract
with the employee's willingness to begin or continue work, or 2) the
reliance that the employee places upon such promises made by the em-
ployer (despite the fact that the employer did not bargain for the em-
ployee's continued performance). 98
97. See Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 1983)
("employee's retention of employment constitutes acceptance of the offer of a
unilateral contract"); Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524, 528 (Okla. Ct. App.
1976) (personnel policies extending offers are accepted by continued
performance).
98. See Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457
N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982) (general discussion of consideration where employee ren-
ders requested service and also relies on employer's statements by rejecting
other job offers).
The term validation device is used by Murray to describe the different ways
that promises may be enforced. J. MURRAY, supra note 72, § 58, at 124. The
most common validation device used is consideration. Id. § 73, at 142. Consid-
eration in a contract consists of 1) either a benefit to the promisor or detriment
to the promisee, and 2) bargained for exchange between the parties to the con-
tract such that the promisor's promise induces the promisee's detriment and
that this detriment also induces the promise. Id.
Another validation device is promissory estoppel or detrimental reliance.
Id. § 58, at 124. Promissory estoppel involves a promise by a promisor that rea-
sonably induces reliance by a promisee. Id. § 92, at 200. Promissory estoppel
may be applied where injustice can only be avoided through enforcement of the
contract. Id. For the Restatement formulation of promissory estoppel as a valida-
tion device, see supra note 74.
It should be noted that this particular analysis, viewing consideration and
promissory estoppel as separate and distinct validation devices, may differ from
the terminology used by certain courts where the term "consideration" is used
in a broader sense to encompass contracts validated through bargained for ex-
change or promissory estoppel. See, e.g., Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d
458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982).
It should also be pointed out that regardless of whether the contract is
formed through bargained for consideration or promissory estoppel, an impor-
tant element in the formation of the contract is the employee's awareness of the
terms of the handbook that prevent arbitrary discharge. See Pine River State
Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626 (Minn. 1983) ("The offer must be definite
in form and must be communicated to the offeree."). The fact situations in the
employment handbook cases vary with respect to the requisite degree of the
employee's knowledge of the terms of the handbook. In Brooks v. TWA, an em-
ployee attempted to enforce the provisions of an employment handbook to pro-
tect his right to work at a certain position in the company. 574 F. Supp. 805,
806-07 (D. Colo. 1983). In finding a contract based on the terms in the com-
pany handbook, the court relied on the fact that the plaintiff "had consulted and
relied on the [Management Policies and Procedure Manual] in his daily decisions
and promotions." Id. at 809-10. In Langdon v. Saga Corp., however, an employee
pointed to provisions of an employment handbook in asserting that the em-
ployer was liable for terminating him without just cause. 569 P.2d 524, 526
(Okla. Ct. App. 1976). The Oklahoma Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court decision that the terms of the handbook formed a contract, despite the
absence of a finding by the lower court respecting whether the employee had
any knowledge of the provisions in the handbook. Id. at 527-28. Perhaps the
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Where courts have applied a unilateral contract analysis to find a
contract of employment based on employment handbooks, the obstacles
presented by traditional contract principles are often overcome by sim-
ply rejecting the requirements of mutuality of obligation and additional
consideration.9 9 The courts' unwillingness to require adherence to
these traditional contract principles in the employee handbook context
is consistent with the criticism of these principles as applied to the em-
ployment relationship generally.' 0 0
While some jurisdictions have accepted the theory that employment
handbooks can create an enforceable contract limiting the employer's
right to discharge an employee, many others have refused to find either
an express or an implied in fact contract and have retained the employ-
ment at will doctrine.'10 A few courts have held that there is no enforce-
most extreme position taken in the analysis of the proper validation device is
found in Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., where the New Jersey Supreme Court
took the position that reliance by the employee on the terms of the handbook
will be presumed. 99 NJ. 284, 307, 491 A.2d 1257, 1270, modified, 101 NJ. 10,
499 A.2d 515 (1985). For further discussion of Woolley, see infra notes 139-53
and accompanying text.
99. Courts rejecting the need for mutality of obligation in the formation of
a contract have done so for a variety of reasons. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 600, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (1980) (while mutuality
of obligation is useful rule of construction, consideration is required to form
contract); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983)
(demand for mutuality of obligation is inquiry into adequacy of consideration
that is forbidden by court); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 463-64,
443 N.W.2d 441, 444, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 196 (1982) (while consideration is es-
sential to formation of contract, mutuality of obligation is not). But see Carter v.
Kaskaskia Community Action Agency, 24 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1059, 322 N.E.2d
574, 576 (1974) (mutuality of obligation is required, but is satisfied simply by
employee continuing employment). For a basic discussion of the principle of
mutuality of obligation, see supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
Several courts have discussed a rejection of the doctrine of additional con-
sideration. See, e.g., Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629
(Minn. 1983) (additional consideration is rule of construction that will not pre-
clude parties' formation of contract where intent to do so is express); Yartzoff v.
Democrat-Herald Publishing Co., 281 Or. 651, 657, 576 P.2d 356, 359 (1978)
(continued employment alone provides sufficient consideration). For a basic
discussion of the principle of additional consideration, see supra notes 77-78 and
accompanying text.
100. For a discussion of the courts' unwillingness to adhere to traditional
contract principles, see supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
101. In Richardson v. Charles Cole Memorial Hosp., the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania set forth the typical rationale for the rejection of the use of em-
ployment handbooks as a limitation on the employment at will doctrine. 320 Pa.
Super. 106, 466 A.2d 1084 (1983). The employment handbook in question con-
tained both a statement regarding termination for just cause and a list of termi-
nation procedures to be followed by the employer. Id. at 108, 466 A.2d at 1085.
In rejecting the employee's argument that the policies set forth in the handbook
constituted part of the contract of employment, the court held that the policies
were mere gratuities rather than an enforceable promise and that there was no
bargained for consideration validating the contract. Id. at 108-09, 466 A.2d at
1085. The court stressed that under Pennsylvania law, the only right of action
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able promise made by the employer in an employment handbook
because there is no definite statement concerning term of employ-
ment. 10 2 Similarly, some courts have concluded that a handbook only
makes general statements of company policy without evincing an intent
to be contractually bound. 10 3
Other courts have focused on the validation device necessary to
form a contract in order to retain the employment at will doctrine. In
this regard, a few courts still adhere to the common law principles of
mutuality of obligation and additional consideration. 10 4 Courts have
also based their refusal to limit the employment at will doctrine on the
an employee has against an employer for wrongful discharge is through a viola-
tion of public policy. Id. at 107-08, 466 A.2d at 1085 (citing Geary v. United
States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974)). For a survey of other
cases in which the court has refused to find an express or implied in fact contract
regarding job security provisions based on an employment handbook, see supra
note 9.
102. See, e.g., White v. Chelsea Indus., 425 So. 2d 1090, 1091 (Ala. 1983) (if
no agreement specifying definite duration of employment services, employment
is at will); Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095, 1096 (Del. 1982)
(plaintiff has no contract rights where handbook does not specify definite term
of employment for company employees); Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App.
1, 7, 328 N.E.2d 775, 779 (1975) (court will not reach question of whether en-
forceable unilateral contract exists absent promise of employment for ascer-
tained period); Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 54, 551 P.2d
779, 782 (1976) (if handbook neither expressly provides for fixed term of em-
ployment, nor includes language from which contract of fixed term could be
inferred, contract is at will); Mau v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 314, 299
N.W.2d 147, 151 (1980) (if books or documents provided to plaintiff do not
promise definite term of employment, contract of employment is at will).
103. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp. 910, 916
(E.D. Mich. 1977) (purpose of handbook given to plaintiff is to inform employ-
ees about benefits and privileges provided by corporation and to inform them of
certain corporate policies; handbook should not be interpreted as guaranteeing
employees continued work), amended, 456 F. Supp. 650 (E.D. Mich. 1978);
Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., 446 A.2d 1095, 1097 (Del. 1982) (handbook does
not alter status of employee at will where booklet is unilateral expression of
defendant's policies and procedures issued for benefit of employees); Johnson v.
National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 54, 551 P.2d 779, 782 (1976) (employ-
ment at will where handbook given employee appears to be no more than gen-
eral statement of company policy); Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 196 Mont.
178, 183, 638 P.2d 1063, 1066 (1982) (employment is at will where handbook
constituted unilateral statement of company policy and procedures); Mau v.
Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 314, 299 N.W.2d 147, 151 (1980) (employ-
ment is at will where handbook only points out benefits to employee of remain-
ing employed by bank).
104. See, e.g., Degen v. Investors Diversified Serv., 260 Minn. 424, 428, 110
N.W.2d 863, 866 (1961) (absent additional consideration, employment is no
more than indefinite general hiring terminable at will of either party); Gates v.
Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 183, 638 P.2d 1063, 1066 (1982) (em-
ployee handbook cannot become part of plaintiffis employment contract because
of lack of new and independent consideration for its terms); Mau v. Omaha Nat'l
Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 313, 299 N.W.2d 147, 150 (1980) (contract of employment,
in absence of good consideration in addition to services contracted to be ren-
dered, is indefinite hiring terminable at will of either party).
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timing of the employee's receipt of a handbook. Some courts have held
that where the employee is given the handbook after beginning employ-
ment, there can be no contract based on the terms of the handbook. 10 5
Principally, these courts reason that the distribution of a handbook to an
employee after the employee begins to work for an employer evidences
a lack of either bargained for exchange or reliance necessary to prove
promissory estoppel. 10 6
Courts and commentators have discussed various methods through
which the employer may avoid litigation over the terms contained in an
employment handbook.' 0 7 The most obvious method is refraining from
setting forth a company policy regarding the conditions upon which an
employee may be terminated.10 8 Alternatively, the employer may be
able to retain the benefits of an employment handbook, yet minimize its
liability through the use of disclaimers. 10 9 Disclaimers, however, may
not have the intended effect of preventing litigation; rather, disclaimers
may only provide the employer with a defense during litigation. 10 The
course of action the employer takes will depend upon the needs of the
employer and its philosophy regarding the employment relationship. " '1
105. See, e.g., Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 55, 551
P.2d 779, 782 (1976) (factor in applying at will doctrine is that manual was not
published until long after plaintiff's hiring); Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 196
Mont. 178, 183, 638 P.2d 1063, 1066 (1982) (employee handbook distributed
after employee is hired does not become part of employee's contract); Mau v.
Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 314, 299 N.W.2d 147, 151 (1980) (at will rule
applies if employer furnished materials to plaintiff after employment
commenced).
106. Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 55, 551 P.2d 779,
782 (1976) (employment manual was published after plaintiffs employment
commenced).
107. See Decker, supra note 93, at 218-29; Comment, supra note 37, at 264-
65.
108. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 619,
292 N.W.2d 880, 894 (1980) ("an employer who establishes no personnel poli-
cies instills no reasonable expectations of performance"); Woolley v. Hoffman-
La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 306, 491 A.2d 1257, 1269 ("If, however, the at-will
status of the workforce was so important, the employer should not have circu-
lated a document so likely to lead employees into believing they had job secur-
ity."), modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985).
109. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 230-31, 685
P.2d 1081, 1088 (1984) (en banc). In Thompson, the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton stressed that the employer may specifically state that nothing contained in
the handbook is intended to be part of the employment relationship. Id. In
addition, the employer may include a more limited disclaimer by writing the
policies so that duration of employment remains within the discretion of the
employer. Id. For a description of total and partial disclaimers that employers
could include in a handbook, see Decker, supra note 93, at 223-26.
110. Decker, supra note 93, at 223.
111. Id.
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III. RECENT STATEMENTS ON THE USE OF THE EMPLOYMENT HANDBOOK
AS A LIMITATION ON THE EMPLOYMENT AT WILL DOCTRINE
Against this background, several recent cases have provided an in-
depth contractual analysis regarding the employment handbook as a
means of providing job security."12 These cases are not only represen-
tative of the development of the law in this area, but also raise important
questions regarding the limits to which courts should extend a contract
analysis, through their interpretation of the required promise or their
determination of a proper validation device, in the context of represen-
tations in employment handbooks.
In Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 1 '3 the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota rejected many common arguments against contractual liability of
the employer based on a handbook, and allowed the employee to re-
cover under a strict application of unilateral contract principles.' 14 In
this case, Pine River State Bank hired Richard Mettille as a loan of-
ficer." 1 5 After completing a six-month probationary period, Mettille re-
ceived from the bank a printed employee handbook containing company
policy concerning disciplinary and discharge procedures. 1 16 Less than
one year later, the bank conducted a review of Mettille's work and found
deficiencies in his management of numerous loan portfolios. 1 7 After
firing Mettille, the bank sued him to recover two notes owed the bank
that were in default."18 Mettille counterclaimed, alleging breach of con-
tract due to the bank's failure to follow the procedures outlined in its
handbook.11 9 The trial court entered a judgment in favor of Mettille.120
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
"personnel handbook provisions, if they meet the requirements for for-
mation of a unilateral contract, may become enforceable as part of the
original employment contract." 12 1 Thus, where the handbook language
112. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d
880 (1980); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983);
Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 101
NJ. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985); Banas v. Matthews Int'l Corp., 502 A.2d 637 (Pa.
Super. 1985).
113. 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
114. Id. at 626.
115. Id. at 624.
116. Id. A section of the handbook entitled "Disciplinary Policy" detailed
the procedures to be undertaken before a discharge would occur. Id. at 626 n.3.
These procedures included an oral reprimand, followed by written reprimands,
ultimately followed by discharge. Id.
117. Id. at 624-25.
118. Id. at 625. The bank claimed that the main reason it fired Mettille was
because of the loan errors, although his excessive sick leave was also a factor. Id.
119. Id. Mettille argued that he was not fired for "just cause" because of the
fact that his discharge resulted purely from a personality dispute with his superi-
ors. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 627.
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constitutes an offer, and it is communicated to the employee through
the employee's receipt of the handbook, the employee may accept the
offer by continuing in the performance of his job.122
In so holding, the court rejected several arguments typically raised
by defendants in such breach of contract actions. First, the court ad-
dressed the argument that because the original contract of employment
failed to specify a duration, the parties did not intend any restrictions
contained in the handbook to be binding. 123 The court rejected this
argument, indicating that the employment at will doctrine is a rule of
contract construction rather than a rule of substantive limitation. 24
Second, the court considered the argument that additional considera-
tion is required to render any subsequent modification enforceable. 125
Again, the court ruled that such a principle was only a rule of construc-
tion, and not a binding substantive rule of law. 126 Finally, the court
found no merit in the argument that mutuality of obligation was re-
quired, holding that the application of that principle amounts to an in-
quiry into the adequacy of consideration, which is forbidden in
Minnesota and many other states.' 2 7
The Michigan Supreme Court, in Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield,12 8 applied a more expansive view of the unilateral contract analy-
sis regarding the proper validation of the employer's promise. In Tous-
saint, Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan (Blue Cross) hired Charles
Toussaint for a middle management position. 129 Upon an inquiry by
Toussaint regarding job security, Blue Cross handed him a handbook
122. Id. at 626-27. The court noted that not only can a contract be formed
in this manner, but also an existing contract may be modified by a subsequent
unilateral contract. Id. at 627.
123. Id. at 628.
124. Id. The court stressed that "[i]f the parties choose to provide in their
employment contract of an indefinite duration for provisions of job security,
they should be able to do so." Id.
125. Id. at 628.
126. Id. at 629. For example, the court pointed out that handbook provi-
sions regarding bonuses, severance pay, and commission rates are enforceable
without additional consideration. Id.
127. Id.
128. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980). This case is actually a consoli-
dation of two cases. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 79 Mich. App.
429, 262 N.W.2d 848 (1977); Ebling v. Masco Corp., 79 Mich. App. 531, 261
N.W.2d 74 (1977). In Toussaint, the plaintiff based his claim for breach of con-
tract on oral and written statements made by the employer as well as company
handbook given to the plaintiff. 79 Mich. App. at 431-32, 262 N.W.2d at 849. In
Ebling, the plaintiff based his claim solely on oral assurances made by the em-
ployer. 79 Mich. App. at 532-33, 261 N.W.2d at 76. This note's analysis of
Toussaint is concerned with the finding of a contract upon Toussaint's receipt of
a company handbook. For a discussion of employer representation in the form
of oral assurances, see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
129. 408 Mich. at 595, 292 N.W.2d at 883.
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that contained an assurance of job security.13 0 After being employed
with Blue Cross for five years, however, Toussaint was discharged by
Blue Cross. 13 1 He brought an action against his former employer for a
violation of an employment agreement that allegedly allowed discharge
only for just cause.' 32 The trial court rendered a verdict in favor of
Toussaint, l3 3 but the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
regardless of whether the employee's manual was part of the employ-
ment contract, the employment contract was terminable at will.' 34
The Michigan Supreme Court, in reversing the court of appeals,
held that an employer's statements of policy in an employment hand-
book can give rise to contractual rights in employees without evidence
that the parties agreed the statements would create contractual
rights. 135 The Michigan Supreme Court emphasized that an employer
did not have an obligation to establish such policies.' 3 6 However, once
policies are established, the court observed that the employment rela-
tionship is enhanced and the employer has created a situation "instinct
with an obligation."' 3 7 In so holding, the court rejected the defendant's
argument that separate consideration and mutuality of obligation are re-
quired to form a contract based on the terms in an employment
manual. 13 8
130. Id. at 597-98, 292 N.W.2d at 884. The handbook provided that certain
disciplinary procedures applied to all Blue Cross employees who completed
their probationary period. Id. The handbook also stated that the company had a
policy of releasing employees "for just cause only." Id.
131. Id. at 595, 292 N.W.2d at 883.
132. Id. Toussaint testified that during his hiring interview, an officer of
Blue Cross told him that if he came to Blue Cross he would never have to look
for a new job because the officer "knew of no one ever being discharged." Id. at
597 n.5, 292 N.W.2d at 884 n.5. Plaintiff argued that this statement and the
representations made in the handbook gave rise to an enforceable employment
contract. Id.
133. Id. at 595, 292 N.W.2d at 883.
134. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 79 Mich. App. 429, 435, 262
N.W.2d 848, 851 (1977). The court of appeals also concluded that the jury ver-
dict could not be sustained as an oral contract for a specified term because it
would violate the statute of frauds. Id. at 435-39, 262 N.W.2d at 851-53.
135. 408 Mich. at 614-15, 292 N.W.2d at 892. The court stated that a con-
tract could exist even though the parties did not sign the policy. Id. Further, the
court declared that it did not matter that the policy failed to refer to any specific
employee. Id. The court also noted that there was no significance in the fact
that the employer did not refer to handbook policies while interviewing the
plaintiff. Id. at 615, 292 N.W.2d at 892. Finally, the court found little signifi-
cance in the fact that the employee did not learn of the policies until after his
employment began. Id.
136. Id. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
137. Id. (citing Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E.
214 (1917); McCall Co. v. Wright, 133 A.D. 62, 117 N.Y.S. 775 (1909)).
138. Id. at 599-600, 292 N.W.2d at 885. The Toussaint court dismissed the
need to apply the principles of separate consideration and mutuality of obliga-
tion by characterizing these traditional contract principles as rules of construc-
tion. Id. at 600, 292 N.W.2d at 885. The court held that separate consideration
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One of the most recent statements of the law on the issue of con-
tractual liability based on an employment handbook is Woolley v. Hoff-
man-La Roche, Inc. 139 The New Jersey Supreme Court reaffirms if not
expands the broad unilateral contract analysis set forth in Toussaint. In
Woolley, Hoffman-La Roche hired the plaintiff, an engineer, in November
1969.140 One month later, Woolley received and read a personnel man-
ual that contained statements of company policy regarding termina-
tion.' 4 1 Woolley continued working for nine years, receiving several
promotions.14 2 In 1978, however, the company fired Woolley because a
general manager lost confidence in Woolley's work. 143 Woolley filed a
complaint alleging breach of contract on the theory that the employ-
ment handbook created a contract providing that employees could be
fired for just cause only, and then only after the procedures outlined in
the handbook were followed. 144 At trial, the court granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment and the appellate division affirmed. 14 5
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that "absent a
clear and prominent disclaimer, an implied promise contained in an em-
ployment manual that an employee will be fired only for cause may be
enforceable against an employer even when the employment is for an
indefinite term and would otherwise be terminable at will.' 1 46 The
court stressed that changes in the employment relationship justify en-
and mutuality of obligation are not necessary to the formation of a contract. Id.
Rather, the court ruled that the proper inquiry is whether there is consideration
for the original employment contract. Id.
Justice Ryan's dissenting opinion in Toussaint emphasized the lack of evi-
dence in the record from which a trier of fact could conclude that the mutual
assent required to form a contract existed. Id. at 647, 292 N.W.2d at 907 (Ryan,
J., dissenting). The dissent, however, indicated that the plaintiff could have pro-
ceeded upon a theory of promissory estoppel in order to form a contract. Id. at
649-50, 292 N.W.2d at 908 (Ryan, J., dissenting). However, the plaintiff did not
plead such a case and there was no evidence in the record that the plaintiff actu-
ally relied on the policy statements contained in the handbook. Id.
139. 99 NJ. 284,491 A.2d 1257, modified, 101 N.J. 10,499 A.2d 515 (1985).
140. Id. at 286, 491 A.2d at 1258.
141. Id. The handbook specifically stated, "It is the policy of Hoffman-La
Roche to retain to the extent consistent with company requirements, the serv-
ices of all employees who perform their duties efficiently and effectively." Id. at
287 n.2, 491 A.2d at 1259 n.2. The handbook also listed the types of termina-
tion in the company as "layoff," "discharge due to performance," "discharge,
disciplinary," "retirement," and "resignation." Id.
142. Id. at 286, 491 A.2d at 1258.
143. Id. Hoffman La-Roche asked plaintiff for his resignation on several oc-
casions. Id. On each occasion, plaintiff refused. Id.
144. Id. at 286-87, 491 A.2d at 1258.
145. Id. at 287, 491 A.2d at 1258-59. The New Jersey Superior Court, Ap-
pellate Division, found that since the handbook did not set forth specific terms
of employment, such as hours and duties of the employee, the handbook repre-
sented a unilateral expression of company policy for which the plaintiff did not
bargain. Id. at 289, 491 A.2d at 1259-60.
146. Id. at 285-86, 491 A.2d at 1258.
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forcing a contract against an employer based on terms contained in an
employment handbook,' 47 and that it must balance the interests of the
employer with those of the employee. 14 8 The Woolley court explained
that although the laissez-faire climate that encouraged industrial growth
may have warranted the employment at will doctrine in a previous era,
the twentieth-century employer is typically a corporation with superior
bargaining power over a large number of employees, and accordingly
the limitation on the employment at will doctrine is necessary to provide
stability in employment relations.149
While in many ways adopting the same unilateral contract analysis
applied in Toussaint and Pine River,150 the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Woolley chose to expand the employer's liability for breach of contract to
situations where the employee is not aware of the termination provisions
of handbook.' 5 ' The court simply presumed the reliance of the em-
ployee on the terms of the handbook in order to establish a validation
device for the formation of the employment contract.1 52 Thus, because
of this presumption of reliance, the court held that the handbook be-
comes binding the moment it is distributed.' 53
Another recent statement of the law concerning employment hand-
books was set forth in Banas v. Matthews International Corp. 15 4 The Supe-
rior Court of Pennsylvania in Banas centered its analysis on the type of
employer promise necessary to create a contractual limitation on the
employment at will doctrine. In Banas, the plaintiff worked as a tooler
for a company that made bronze grave markers.' 5 5 The company fired
Banas after he admitted that he made and removed a grave marker from
the plant, placing it on his nephew's grave. 156 He brought suit against
147. Id. at 290-92, 491 A.2d 1260-62.
148. Id. at 291, 491 A.2d at 1261 (citing Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 66-67, 417 A.2d 505, 511 (1980)).
149. Id. at 292, 491 A.2d at 1261 (citing Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 66,417 A.2d 505, 511 (1980)). The Woolley court asserted that
"any application of the employment-at-will rule... must be tested by its legiti-
macy today and not by its acceptance yesterday." Id. at 292, 491 A.2d at 1262.
150. The Woolley court, much like the Toussaint and Pine River courts, stated
that the handbook is an offer that seeks the formation of a unilateral contract
through the employee's acceptance in the form of continued performance at
work. Id. at 302, 491 A.2d at 1267.
151. Id. at 302-03, 491 A.2d at 1267.
152. Id. at 304, 491 A.2d at 1268. The court stated that unless it presumed
reliance, a strict contractual analysis might protect the rights of some employees
but not others. Id. at 304 n.10, 491 A.2d at 1268 n.10.
153. Id. at 305 n.10, 491 A.2d at 1268 n.10.
154. 502 A.2d 637 (Pa. Super. 1985).
155. Id. at 638.
156. Id. The dispute arose because the cemetery where the nephew's grave
was located had an agreement with the plaintiffs employer that all grave mark-
ers would be purchased through the cemetery. Id. The grave marker taken by
the plaintiff was not purchased through the cemetery, which filed a complaint
with the company. Id.
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Matthews International Corporation for breach of contract,' 57 arguing
that a handbook he had received gave employees the right to personal
use of company time and equipment, provided they obtained permission
from a supervisor.' 5 8
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, sitting en banc and reversing
the trial court's award for Banas, held that regardless of whether Banas
had permission to make the grave marker and was authorized under the
employment handbook to engage in this activity, he was still an em-
ployee at will subject to a viable employment at will doctrine, namely,
dismissal for any or no reason.1 59 The court acknowledged that the
doctrine has been limited through various statutory laws and public pol-
icy torts designed to protect the employee. 160 However, the court
stressed that a contractual limitation on the doctrine in the context of
employment handbooks must, if at all, be based on either a just cause
provision or grievance procedures, both of which deal directly with the
issue of job security. 16 1
The dissent in Banas argued that the terms contained in the employ-
ment handbook could modify the employee's at will status, despite the
157. Id. Banas also brought an action for defamation based on remarks
about the dismissal made by two of the employer's officers. Id.
158. Id. The employment handbook contained the following provision:
"Employees are not generally permitted to work on personal jobs during com-
pany time or on company premises. However, supervisors will often cooperate
by giving permission for you to use our equipment and waste material for your
personal work." Id. at 641. Banas did not argue that he had a contractual right
to a specific duration of employment. Id. at 656 (Beck, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Rather, he argued that the handbook provisions formed the
basis of a unilateral contract that limited the employer's power to terminate the
employee under those terms. Id.
159. Id. at 648.
160. Id. at 646. The court also recognized that proof of consideration in
addition to services rendered may be sufficient to establish that the employment
was not at will but for a definite time. Id. at 646-47.
161. Id. at 647-48. The court stated, "Since here the handbook did not
contain, expressly or by clear implication, any just cause provision, appellee has
shown nothing to take his case out of the settled employee-at-will rule." Id. at
648. The court also observed that the employment handbook did contain provi-
sions regarding procedures to be followed with respect to "Disciplinary Action."
Id. at 64 7-48 n. 10. These procedures required review of at least two supervisors
prior to dismissal. Id. at 647 n.10. The court noted that Banas did not raise this
issue, most likely because the record revealed that two supervisors did review his
case. Id. at 647-48 n.10.
The court in a dictum indicated that if the handbook contained a just cause
provision, Banas' claim might have had merit. Id. at 647-48. However, a major-
ity of the court would not specifically address this issue since it was deemed
irrelevant to Banas' claim. Id. at 647. In addition, the court rejected the notion
that an employee who is discharged may rely on the terms of a handbook under
the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Id. at 648 n. 12. Although the court recog-
nized that promissory estoppel may be applied when consideration for an ex-
isting promise is absent, the court stressed that in Banas the doctrine could not
provide a basis for relief because there was no promise and therefore no reli-
ance. Id.
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fact that such terms do not deal with job security. 16 2 Applying a unilat-
eral contract analysis, the dissent opined that by remaining on the job
after an employee is given a handbook, all of the provisions of the hand-
book "are binding on both parties as conditions of employment until
modified by a subsequent offer and acceptance of new conditions."' 16 3
IV. ANALYSIS: PARAMETERS OF THE EMPLOYMENT HANDBOOK AS A
LIMITATION ON THE EMPLOYMENT AT WILL DOCTRINE
It is submitted that the drastic social and economic changes that
have occurred within the employment relationship since the late nine-
teenth century warrant the limitations that have been placed upon the
employment at will doctrine. 164 The Woolley court relied on these
changes to justify enforcing a contract against an employer based on
terms contained in an employment handbook. 16 5 The Banas court,
though refusing to place liability on the employer based on a specific
term in its employment handbook, also recognized the need to limit the
employment at will doctrine. 166 Moreover, the use of contract reme-
dies, as seen in Pine River, Toussaint, and Woolley, has become especially
important in light of the shortcomings of other means of limiting the
employment at will doctrine such as collective bargaining, statutory rem-
162. Id. at 655-56 (Beck, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
dissent explained that the handbook acts as a framework in which to examine the
employee's employment at will status. Id. Just as public policy may carve out
exceptions to employment at will, so may the particular terms of an employment
manual. Id. at 656 (Beck, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
163. Id. at 658 (Beck, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
Superior Court of Pennsylvania has very recently addressed another variation on
the terms found in a handbook which an employee alleged limits the employ-
ment at will rule. Martin v. Capital Cities Media Inc., No 01064 (Pa, Super. June
12, 1986). In Martin, the employment handbook listed a number of acts such as
dishonesty or fighting which provide grounds for discharge. Id. In the hand-
book, the employer stressed that the list of acts was not inclusive and that the
employee could be fired for "any other just causes." Id. The handbook did not
indicate that employees would be fired for just cause only, nor did the handbook
set forth procedures for termination of employees. Id. The court held that such
terms do not create a term of the employment contract limiting the employment
at will doctrine. Id.
164. The greatest change affecting the employment relationship has been
the decrease in the employee's bargaining power with the employer. For a dis-
cussion of the social and economic factors contributing to this change, see supra
note 18 and accompanying text.
165. 99 NJ. at 290-92, 491 A.2d 1260-62. In Woolley, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey stressed that the interests of employers must be balanced against
those of the employees, even though this restricts the employment at will doc-
trine, in order to assure stability in employment relations. Id. For a further
discussion of the Woolley court's interpretation of the changes in the employment
relationship, see supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
166. 502 A.2d at 646. In Banas, the court recognized the existence of statu-
tory exceptions to the employment at will doctrine as well as numerous cases
recognizing a public policy exception. Id.
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edies, and tort remedies. 16 7
The need to limit the employment at will doctrine, however, cannot
alone justify finding an enforceable contract based on representations in
an employment handbook. Indeed, even though the common law em-
ployment at will doctrine developed with little justification,' 68 it is now a
firmly entrenched component of our common law tradition. 169 Accord-
ingly, courts should not enforce changes limiting the employment at will
doctrine absent proper and articulable justifications. 170
Initially, Wood fashioned the rule establishing the employment at
will doctrine in terms of a rebuttable presumption.'71 Many American
jurisdictions treated the rule, however, as precluding enforcement of
employment contracts with an indefinite term of employment.172 Thus,
a critical question in evaluating the employment handbook as a limita-
tion on the employment at will doctrine is to determine whether the
doctrine is a substantive limitation on contract formation or merely a
rule of construction.17 3 Most recent cases dealing with employment
handbooks, including Pine River, Toussaint, and Woolley, have found the
employment at will doctrine to be a mere rule of construction.1 74 This
result is justified in light of the parties' freedom to contract.' 7 5 Indeed,
167. For a discussion of the limitations of collective bargaining, statutory
remedies, and tort remedies, see supra notes 24, 37 & 52 and accompanying text.
168. For a discussion of the criticism of Wood's rule, see supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
169. Though commentators suggest that Horace Wood adopted the em-
ployment at will doctrine without supporting authority, many jurisdictions in the
nineteenth century nonetheless followed the doctrine by simply citing Wood's
statement of it. For a discussion of the acceptance of Wood's formulation, see
supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
170. As one writer comments, the law of employment is "an area of law
which has traditionally been characterized by a lack of clear analysis and careful
reasoning." Note, supra note 10, at 394. It is submitted that courts should heed
the concerns expressed by this commentator, and resist the temptation to re-
strict the employment at will doctrine in the absence of proper legal justification.
171. See Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 466, 443 N.E.2d 441,
446, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 198 (1982) (adoption of employment at will rule in New
York resulted in rebuttable presumption); Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 601-02, 292
N.W.2d at 886 (Wood's rule stated as rebuttable presumption).
172. See Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 603, 292 N.W.2d at 887 ("Some courts saw
the rule as requiring the employee to prove an express contract for a definite
term in order to maintain an action based on termination of the employment.").
173. See Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 546, 688
P.2d 170, 172 (1984) (en banc). For a discussion of Leikvold, see Note, Limiting
Employment-At-Will in Arizona: Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 27
ARIZ. L. REV. 235 (1985).
174. See Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 600, 292 N.W.2d at 884; Pine River, 333
N.W.2d at 628; Woolley, 99 N.J. at 295, 491 A.2d at 1263. See also Leikvold v.
Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 546, 688 P.2d 170, 172 (1984)
(en banc) (doctrine of employment at will is rule of construction).
175. Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 628. See also Note, supra note 53, at 211-12
(employment at will doctrine as rule of construction is justified based on parties'
freedom of contract).
1986] NOTE 367
33
McWilliams: The Employment Handbook as a Contractual Limitation on the Employ
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the Minnesota Supreme Court in Pine River observed that "[i]f the par-
ties choose to provide in their employment contract of indefinite dura-
tion for provisions of job security, they should be able to do SO."' 1 7 6
Assuming the employment at will doctrine is to be treated as a rule
of construction, evidence that the parties agreed to terms regarding job
security may rebut the presumption of employment at will. Therefore,
having satisfied this threshhold determination, a proper analysis must
shift its focus to the basis for finding an agreement between the em-
ployer and employee regarding job security. As indicated above, courts
recently have relied upon a unilateral contract analysis to bind the em-
ployer to job security provisions found in the employment handbook.' 7 7
It is submitted that the promise necessary for the formation of a
unilateral contract exists where the employer includes in the employ-
ment handbook either a just cause provision or a statement of termina-
tion procedures.' 78 Courts holding that there is no promise contained
in an employment handbook have stressed that there are no definite
terms contained in the handbook specifying the duration of employ-
ment. I 79 This criticism, however, assumes that the employment at will
doctrine is a substantive limitation on the formation of employment con-
tracts of indefinite duration. Yet, it is submitted that the employment at
will doctrine has been properly treated by most courts, including Tous-
saint, Pine River, and Woolley, as a rule of construction.18 0 This interpre-
tation has been soundly justified based on the parties' freedom of
176. 333 N.W.2d at 628.
177. In the unilateral contract analysis, the promisor manifests his intention
that he wishes performance from the promisee in exchange for his own promise.
J. MURRAY, supra note 72, § 6, at 10-11. The contract is formed when the prom-
isee completes performance. Id. § 6, at 11. For a further discussion of unilateral
contract analysis and its application to the employment relationship, see supra
notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
178. As Perritt pointed out in discussing Pine River, Toussaint, and other
cases dealing with employment handbooks, "the promise element was easy to
satisfy; the employer had communicated reasonably explicit assurances that em-
ployment would be terminated only for cause or only after exhaustion of certain
procedures." H. PERRITr, supra note 15, § 4.7, at 131.
179. See, e.g., White v. Chelsea Indus., 425 So. 2d 1090, 1091 (Ala. 1983)
(since there is no agreement specifying definite duration of employment, rela-
tionship is one of employment at will); Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 446
A.2d 1095, 1096 (Del. 1982)(where handbook does not set out definite term of
employment, "at will" status is not altered); Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind.
App. 1, 7, 328 N.E.2d 775, 778 (1975) (even assuming reliance of employee may
validate contract, in absence of promise that employment will continue for defi-
nite period, relationship is terminable at will). For a further discussion of this
view of the legal insignificance of other representations contained in employ-
ment handbooks, where the handbook fails to specify an employment term, see
supra note 102 and accompanying text.
180. For a discussion of the treatment of the employment at will doctrine as
a rule of construction as expressed in Toussaint, Pine River, and Woolley, see supra
note 174 and accompanying text.
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contract.' 8 ' Therefore, as Pine River indicates, the employer's willing-
ness to agree to employment on particular terms of unspecified duration
may constitute an offer as long as the offer is definite in form.' 8 2 Just
cause provisions and representations regarding termination procedures
are adequately explicit statements made by the employer regarding job
security and may be treated as offers-and enforceable promises upon
acceptance by employee performance. 18 3
While just cause provisions and termination procedures provide an
explicit promise by the employer regarding job security, a question
raised by Banas is whether the terms in a handbook not dealing with job
security directly may provide a contractual basis for limiting the employ-
ment at will doctrine. In Banas, an employee alleged breach of contract
upon his termination for personal use of company property and equip-
ment, despite the fact that a handbook given to the employee stated that
employees may use company property and equipment with their super-
visor's permission. 184 It appears unlikely that the jurisdictions not rec-
ognizing just cause provisions or termination procedures as enforceable
promises will recognize handbook provisions unrelated to job security
as a basis for limiting the employment at will doctrine. 185 It is unclear,
however, whether jurisdictions that regard just cause provisions and
statements as to termination procedures as enforceable promises will al-
low non-job security provisions to create an enforceable promise. A
court such as Pine River, applying a strict unilateral contract analysis,
may agree with the majority in Banas that only job security provisions
provide the basis for an enforceable promise limiting the employment at
will doctrine. 186 A court applying a more liberal interpretation of uni-
lateral contract principles, such as Woolley, might agree with the dissent
in Banas and find an enforceable promise based on non-job security
181. For a discussion of freedom of contract as a basis for interpreting the
employment at will doctrine as a rule of construction, see supra note 175 and
accompanying text.
182. 333 N.W.2d at 626.
183. H. PERRIrr, supra note 15, § 4.7, at 131.
184. 502 A.2d at 638. For further discussion of the facts of Banas, see supra
notes 154-63 and accompanying text.
185. Clearly, a jurisdiction holding that handbook provisions dealing with
termination procedures are not enforceable promises because they do not define
a specific duration of employment will not find an enforceable promise based on
a provision such as the one in Banas, dealing with the employee's use of com-
pany materials. See Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 7, 328 N.E.2d 775,
779 (1975).
186. The court in Pine River stressed that "[a]n employer's general state-
ments of policy are no more than that and do not meet the contractual require-
ments of an offer." 333 N.W.2d at 626. The court was referring to a general
statement made by the employer that the employee "had a great future with the
company." Id. However, non-job security provisions may also be viewed as
mere "general statements of policy" because the employer has not clearly stated
that he intends the statements to limit his ability to discharge an employee.
NOTE
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provisions. ' 8 7
Regardless of whether a promise can be derived from statements in
the handbook, the fact that an employee must establish a validating de-
vice to make the promise enforceable under a unilateral contract analy-
sis presents a major obstacle. 18 8 It is submitted, however, that an
employer makes an enforceable promise by including a just cause provi-
sion or statement of termination procedures in a handbook because
these representations induce the employee to continue working for the
employer. 18 9 Embracing this position, the Toussaint court reasoned that
policy statements found in a handbook are contractually enforceable be-
cause "the employer secures an orderly, cooperative and loyal work
force, and the employee the peace of mind associated with the job secur-
ity and the conviction that he will be treated fairly."' 9 0 Similarly, the
Woolley court added that an employer does not unintentionally set forth
general statements of policy in employment handbooks, but rather pro-
vides an employee with benefits for the purpose of remaining competi-
tive with, and to ensure success against, other employers.' 9 '
187. The court in Woolley used language indicating that employees may ex-
pect to be able to exercise rights given to them in the handbook without being
fired. 99 N.J. at 297-98, 491 A.2d at 1264. The court stated that "when an
employer of a substantial number of employees circulates a manual that, when
fairly read, provides that certain benefits are an incident of the employment...
the judiciary ... should construe them in accordance with the reasonable expec-
tations of the employees." Id.
188. For example, courts at one time required proof of consideration in
addition to services rendered in order to make the promise enforceable. For a
discussion of the traditional requirements of mutuality of obligation and addi-
tional consideration, see supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
189.. The employer, by expressing its policies, knows the employee will
probably be more productive and cooperative because of these policies. The
employer is aware of this when developing the guidelines contained in the hand-
book. It is the fact that the employer knows he or she will receive this reaction
from the employee that provides the validation device for the contract.
Numerous commentators have remarked on the benefits derived by employ-
ers due to representations made in employment handbooks. One commentator,
for example, states that "[e]mployers do not issue employment handbooks sim-
ply out of altruistic impulses; they expect to receive some benefit. Likewise, em-
ployees do not read and comply with handbooks simply because they have warm
feelings about their employer; they, too, expect to receive some benefit." Note,
supra note 53, at 219. Similarly, another commentator has observed:
The benefits [an employer receives] include improving employees' atti-
tudes and work performance, discouraging employees from joining un-
ions, and increasing the employer's ability to attract and retain
qualified, career-conscious employees. Thus, employers, by promul-
gating and distributing employee manuals, may receive the advantages
of lower employee turnover and reduced costs of training fewer new
employees.
Comment, supra note 37, at 262 (footnote omitted).
190. 408 Mich. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
191. 99 N.J. at 299, 491 A.2d at 1265. When discussing the importance to
the employer of the handbook distributed in the Woolley case, Judge Wilentz
noted that "the employer wanted to keep it up to date, especially to make cer-
36
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss1/6
Under a proper analysis, then, two bases exist for a court to find a
contract where an employer provides an employee with a handbook. In
one scenario, an employer intends to set forth job security provisions in
its handbook in exchange for a productive and cooperative work force.
In this situation there is bargained for consideration as the validation
device.1 92 In the second scenario, an employer does not actually intend
to bargain for an employee's willingness to abide by its policies, but it is
reasonable for an employee to rely on the promise made by the em-
ployer. Here, the concept of promissory estoppel or detrimental reli-
ance provides the means of validating the contract.
193
Although a unilateral contract analysis does present a practical
means for courts to restrict the employment at will doctrine, it is hardly
a doctrinal panacea. A unilateral contract analysis will justify restricting
the employment at will doctrine only so long as the analysis is strictly
applied. 19 4 In this respect, the Pine River, Toussaint, and Woolley courts
did not agree on whether a unilateral contract agreement exists where
an employee lacks an awareness of the terms of the handbook. The Pine
River court applied a strict unilateral contract analysis, that is, it required
that the terms be expressly communicated to the employee. 19 5 How-
ever, the Toussaint court, in finding a unilateral contract, did not apply as
strict an analysis. Toussaint involved an employee who received a hand-
book in response to his inquiry regarding job security. 19 6 Thus, the em-
ployee clearly knew of the terms concerning termination procedures
found in the employment handbook. The Toussaint court held that the
company policy contained in the handbook was contractually enforcea-
tain, given this employer's good reputation in labor relations, that the benefits
conferred were sufficiently competitive with those available from other employ-
ers, including benefits found in collective bargaining agreements." Id.
192. For example, the Pine River court stated, "If parties choose to provide
in their employment contract of an indefinite duration for provisions ofjob se-
curity, they should be able to do so." 333 N.W.2d at 628. In fact, the jury in
Pine River found that the bank intended the handbook to be binding. Id. at 630
n.6.
193. For example, in Langdon v. Saga Corp., the employer denied that he
intended the statements contained in the handbook to be binding. 569 P.2d
524, 526 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977). The court held that where an employee
foregoes his or her right to refuse future performance in reliance or in partial
reliance on the policies set forth in the handbook, an employer will be bound to
those policies. Id. at 527.
194. For a discussion of a strict unilateral contract analysis, see supra notes
192-93 and accompanying text. The significance of strictly applying a unilateral
contract analysis is that in order to validate the contract and find the employer's
promise enforceable, the employee must be aware of the terms contained in the
handbook. An employee cannot either "bargain for" or "rely on" the terms of
the handbook without knowledge of the terms. See Note, supra note 53, at 213
(before plaintiff can find relief in contract, he must show that he was generally
aware that his employer published policies contained in handbook).
195. 333 N.W.2d at 626.
196. 408 Mich. at 598, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
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ble, especially since the employer had made his policy known to the em-
ployee. 197 Extending the strict analysis of the Pine River court, however,
the Toussaint court in a dictum indicated that an enforceable contract
could still be found where the terms of a handbook were not communi-
cated to the employee. l98
The Woolley court made the strongest and most expansive applica-
tion of unilateral contract analysis to date, allowing the formation of a
unilateral contract where an employee was not aware of the terms of the
handbook.199 In Woolley, the court expressly noted the absence of proof
that the employee either relied on the handbook in continuing his work
or bargained for the employer's promise.200 The court, relying on the
dictum in Toussaint, created a presumption of reliance.20 1  Conse-
quently, the court held that an employee need not be aware of the terms
of the handbook in order for those terms to constitute an enforceable
promise between an employee and an employer.202
It is submitted that the strict adherence to unilateral contract princi-
ples in Pine River is preferable to the extension of these principles sug-
gested in Toussaint and Woolley. Recognizing the presumption created in
Woolley and discussed in the dictum in Toussaint would defeat the very
justification upon which the employer's promise is enforced.
The unilateral contract is validated either through bargained for
consideration or promissory estoppel. Regarding bargained for consid-
eration, the employer intends that the distribution of its handbook con-
taining job security provisions will create a benefit injuring to the
employer in the form of a more productive work force. 20 3 Regarding
promissory estoppel, the employer, as a result of the distribution of the
handbook, can reasonably expect to induce some action or forebearance
197. Id. at 614, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
198. Id. at 614-15, 292 N.W.2d at 892. The Toussaint court stressed that the
employer does not have to set forth any policies in the handbook, but where it
does establish policies, the employer is obligated to abide by them. Id. at 613,
292 N.W.2d at 892. Thus, the court stated, "No pre-employment negotiations
need take place and the parties' minds need not meet on the subject; nor does it
matter that the employee knows nothing of the particulars of the employer's
policies and practices or that the employer may change them unilaterally." Id.
(footnote omitted).
199. 99 NJ. at 304, 491 A.2d at 1268.
200. Id. at 304-05 n.10, 491 A.2d at 1268 n.10.
201. Id. at 303-04, 491 A.2d at 1268 (quoting Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 613,
292 N.W.2d at 892). The Woolley court did not indicate whether this presump-
tion was rebuttable. Id.
202. Id. at 304, 491 A.2d at 1268. The Woolley court reasoned that if reli-
ance was not presumed, a strict contract analysis might unevenly protect some
employees and not others. Id. at 304 n.10, 491 A.2d at 1268 n.10. The court
gave as an example the situation where an employee did not know of the exist-
ence of the manual yet continued to work. Id. Such an employee's continued
work would not be a bargained for detriment. Id.
203. For a discussion of the benefits received by an employer as a result of
issuing a handbook, see supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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on the part of the employees. 20 4 This action or forebearance by the
employees in most cases involves affirmative employee action-in-
creased productivity. Where reliance or bargained for exchange is pre-
sumed, the handbook provisions will be unfairly enforced against the
employer because the employee may not be aware of the handbook pro-
visions and therefore, the employer does not receive the advantages of a
more productive workforce and the employer would not reasonably ex-
pect to induce such action (or any other action or forebearance) on the
part of its employees.2 0 5 Indeed, if the need to protect the employee
who is not even aware of the handbook's terms is so great, the remedy
should be provided through legislation rather than through a manipula-
tion of unilateral contract principles. 20 6
In addition to concerns that courts will overextend the unilateral
contract analysis to effect over-broad restrictions on the employment at
will doctrine, the practical impact on the workplace of enforcing state-
ments in handbooks warrants examination. As a result of decisions such
as Pine River, Toussaint, and Woolley, employers may simply decide to re-
move from their employment handbooks any provisions pertaining to
job security20 7 or to retain these provisions but include disclaimers in
the handbook. 20 8 As a consequence, numerous commentators maintain
that an employee is in no better position than he or she was prior to the
enforcement of the handbook provisions. 20 9
204. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
205. The Woolley court argues that reliance must be presumed because it
would be unfair for some employees to have the benefit of a handbook while
others do not. 99 N.J. at 304 n.10, 491 A.2d at 1268 n.10. However, it is sub-
mitted that the employer should only have to keep his promise regarding job
security provisions where he receives the benefit of a more productive worker.
In this regard, it is fair that some workers receive benefits under the handbook
while others do not.
206. For a discussion of proposed legislation that would require all employ-
ers to fire only upon a showing ofjust cause, see supra note 37 and accompany-
ing text.
If the courts continue to presume reliance, subjecting employers to poten-
tial liability in cases where, through employee ignorance of favorable handbook
policies, the employer does not receive any benefit from issuing its policies, em-
ployers simply may choose to withdraw job security provisions. In situations
where an employer sets forth provisions because of the beneficial effect they
have on employees, the withdrawal of the provisions would place the employees
who actually were aware of them and who relied on them in a worse position.
207. For a discussion of the employer's ability to delete job security provi-
sions from the employment handbook, see supra note 108 and accompanying
text.
208. For a discussion of the employer's ability to include disclaimers in or-
der to avoid contractual liability for job security provisions, see supra notes 109-
10 and accompanying text.
209. One commentator has noted that the ultimate result of enforcing
handbook provisions may be a mixed blessing for at will employees. Note, supra
note 173, at 242. Employees working for employers who maintain job security
provisions will find protection. Id. However, the long-term effect of enforcing
these provisions may be to decrease protection of employees at will because
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Two points merit attention with respect to the effect of enforcing
handbook provisions on the protection of at will employees. First, there
may be employers who will accept contractual liability in return for the
benefits received from the employees. 2 10 Under this scenario, the re-
cent developments simply clarify the rights of the parties. Second, the
purpose of imposing contractual liability is not to create new rights for
the employee, but merely to ensure fairness in the employment relation-
ship.2 1 It is better that no job security provisions are announced than
to have an employee read guarantees of job security and rely on them,
only to learn that they are not enforceable.21 2
Despite criticism that enforcement of handbook provisions will ad-
versely affect the status of the employee at will, the employment rela-
tionship will inevitably be enhanced in several ways. As a result of Pine
River, Toussaint, Woolley, and Banas, employers will re-examine the poli-
cies and goals set forth in their employment handbooks. Also, by mak-
ing the provisions of the handbook contractually enforceable, the courts
have injected certainty and predictability into the employment relation-
ship.2 13 This in turn will result in a greater degree of understanding
between an employer and employee regarding the employment relation-
ship and therefore diminish the amount of litigation arising from the
discharge of an employee. 2 14
courts have consistently held that where there are no policies, there can be no
reliance. Id.
210. As one commentator states, "An employer may determine that dis-
charge for cause is a good personnel policy not only because it may be required
by the contract or personnel policies but also because of the beneficial psycho-
logical impact it would have on the workforce." Connolly, Murg & Scharman,
Abrogating the Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Implications for an Employer's Personnel
Policies and Handbooks, 2 PREVENTIvE L. REP. 53, 57 (1983). For a discussion of
the various benefits received by an employer providing employees with assur-
ances of job security in an employment handbook, see supra note 189 and ac-
companying text.
211. For a discussion of the harshness of the employment at will doctrine
and the changes in the employment relationship that have given the employer an
unfair bargaining advantage, see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
212. The Toussaint court emphasized:
An employer who establishes no personnel policies instills no reason-
able expectations of performance .... [However, if] there is in effect a
policy to dismiss for cause only, the employer may not depart from that
policy at whim simply because he was under no obligation to institute
the policy in the first place. Having announced the policy, presumably
with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and
behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not
treat its promise as illusory.
408 Mich. at 619, 292 N.W.2d at 894-95.
213. The employer knows that the inclusion ofjob security provisions leads
to a contractual obligation to follow them. The employee in reading these pro-
visions and relying on them may feel more secure about his job.
214. For a discussion of the effect of the handbook in diminishing litigation
between employers and employees, see Comment, supra note 37, at 264.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The background of the industrial revolution and laissez-faire eco-
nomics, under which the employment at will doctrine developed, no
longer exists. Accordingly, in the contemporary economic and indus-
trial climate, an employee's lack of bargaining power has become an im-
portant factor in evaluating the employment relationship. As a result,
several limitations on the employment at will doctrine have developed.
One of the most recent trends in limiting the employment at will
doctrine is the finding of an express or implied in fact contract from the
provisions regarding job security that an employer sets forth in its em-
ployment handbook. To effect this limitation, courts have properly re-
sorted to a unilateral contract analysis. In this analysis, the terms in the
handbook, whether a just cause provision or an explanation of termina-
tion procedures, constitute a promise. Further, this promise is made
enforceable where an employee continues working with an awareness of
the terms contained in the employment handbook. The validation de-
vice making the agreement enforceable, either bargained for considera-
tion or promissory estoppel, is based on the benefit of a productive
workforce that the employer receives as a result of the issuance of the
handbook.
Although the unilateral contract analysis typically applied in em-
ployment handbook cases is fundamentally sound, recent decisions have
differed on the extent to which a strict unilateral contract analysis should
be followed. In this regard, this note concludes that neither detrimental
reliance nor bargained for consideration should be presumed. To main-
tain clarity and fairness under the unilateral contract analysis, it is sub-
mitted that the court should make knowledge of the terms of the
handbook a predicate to the formation of a contract. By so doing, the
outcome resulting from the application of unilateral contract principles
will accord with the proffered justification for enforcing a unilateral con-
tract in this context-that the employer benefits from a more productive
workforce. Finally, a unilateral contract analysis achieves the laudatory
result of providing certainty in the employment relationship, while
preventing an employer from making illusory promises.
Kelly McWilliams
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